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 The author examines impartiality in cases of politically 
contentious decision making. Many jurisdictions delegate 
decisions over matters such as the establishment of fair election 
ground rules to independent bodies. Some of these bodies, 
including Canada’s Federal Electoral Boundaries Commissions 
(FEBCs), attract widespread trust and are by most accounts 
substantially impartial. In contrast, commissions empanelled to 
draw electoral boundaries in the United States, and to a lesser 
extent in certain Canadian provinces, are often plagued by 
partisanship. 
 The author canvasses approaches to controlling 
partisanship, relying on a series of interviews conducted with 
boundaries commissioners and on interdisciplinary literature on 
trust and trustworthiness in governance. Commentators often 
favour bolstering formal constraints on FEBC discretion. 
However, the author concludes that traditional administrative-
law models favouring such constraints are often inadequate. In 
politically sensitive cases these methods frequently catalyze 
partisanship. Proposals for more nuanced design—design 
sensitive to the complex interactions between law and 
administrative culture in cases where the potential for 
partisanship is high—are better but rarer. The author focuses in 
particular on the use of ambiguity in legal and institutional 
design. Although this approach is counterintuitive in light of 
rule-of-law assumptions favouring clarity, it has nevertheless 
gained traction in commentary and has long been at work in 
practice. The author argues that extensively ambiguous design, 
as displayed by the complex federal readjustment processes in 
Canada, has helped to develop the widely admired impartial 
decision-making cultures of the FEBCs. 
L’auteur étudie l’impartialité dans le contexte de la 
réglementation démocratique, qui définit les règles de base de la 
gouvernance démocratique, et s’attarde spécifiquement à la 
redéfinition des frontières électorales. Certaines institutions, 
telles les commissions canadiennes de délimitation des 
circonscriptions électorales fédérales, bénéficient d’une 
confiance considérable du public et sont pour la plupart 
substantiellement impartiales. Au contraire, plusieurs modes de 
redéfinition des frontières électorales aux États-Unis, et dans une 
moindre mesure dans certaines provinces canadiennes, sont 
entachés de partisannerie. 
S’appuyant sur une littérature interdisciplinaire traitant de la 
confiance et du mérite de la confiance dans la gouvernance, de 
même que sur des entrevues avec des commissaires canadiens à 
la délimitation des circonscriptions électorales fédérales, l’auteur 
étudie diverses approches visant à contrôler la partisannerie. 
Plusieurs commentateurs ont récemment insisté sur la nécessité 
de réformer les commissions canadiennes de délimitation des 
circonscriptions électorales fédérales en renforçant les 
contraintes formelles entourant leur pouvoir de discrétion. 
L’auteur leur répond en concluant que les modèles traditionnels 
de droit administratif permettant d’instaurer de telles contraintes 
formelles se révèlent souvent inadéquats. 
 En situation politiquement délicate, ces modèles catalysent 
fréquemment la partisannerie. Des propositions pour une 
approche plus nuancée—une approche sensible aux complexités 
des interactions entre le droit et les cultures de service civil, où le 
potentiel de partisannerie est élevé—s’avèrent supérieures, mais 
plus rares. L’auteur se penche en particulier sur le recours à 
l’ambiguïté dans la planification juridique et institutionnelle.  
 Bien que cette méthode soit surprenante et contre-intuitive 
à la lumière des assomptions de primauté du droit favorisant la 
clarté, elle a néanmoins gagné en importance dans la littérature et 
existe depuis longtemps en pratique. L’auteur avance que cette 
méthode fortement ambigüe a contribué à développer la culture 
décisionnelle impartiale et renommée des commissions 
canadiennes de délimitation des circonscriptions électorales 
fédérales. 
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Introduction 
 May 2003 saw a bizarre political development out of Texas as Democratic state 
lawmakers boarded a plane to escape the jurisdiction. With a bill to redraw the state’s 
federal congressional districts up for a vote in the Texas Legislature, Governor Rick 
Perry had ordered police to bring Democrats in to fill a quorum.1 Partisan motivation 
behind the new Republican-sponsored electoral map was evident. The proposed 
boundaries concentrated Democratic voters inside relatively few districts. One 
revised congressional district, the Texas 25th, extended over a thin and ragged column 
from the city of Austin to the Mexican border five hundred kilometres south. The 
district united two regions with high concentrations of African Americans, who are 
known as dependable Democratic supporters.2 In addition, coming only two years 
after the last boundary readjustment,3 the Texas gerrymander departed from the 
normal ten-year revision cycle, which is timed to follow the release of census data.4 In 
a final remarkable development, the readjustment plan’s mastermind, the Republican 
leader of the United States House of Representatives, Tom DeLay, called on the 
Department of Homeland Security and other federal offices to track the progress of 
the Democratic jet as it passed into neighbouring Oklahoma.5 With the Texas plan’s 
eventual passage, Republicans took five additional House seats in the 2004 election.6 
 A coherent historical narrative of American political partisanship is difficult to 
trace. But the situation appears to date to the Republic’s origins, with periods of 
relative quiescence and resurgence thereafter.7 The past two decades in particular 
have, according to most accounts, been characterized by personal attacks and 
polemical discourse.8 Commentators now often picture U.S. electoral politics as a 
 
1 Jeffrey Smith, “In Texas Feud, a Plane Tale of Intrigue: U.S. Role in GOP Hunt for Democratic 
Lawmakers Is Still Murky” Washington Post (7 June 2003) A1. 
2 See James T. Campbell, “Second Black Seat Tests Uneasy Coalition” Houston Chronicle (15 
March 2004) A18. 
3 The process of redrawing electoral boundaries goes by “readjustment” in Canada and 
“redistricting” in the United States; for simplicity, I will use only the former.  
4 The Supreme Court of the United States recently invalidated selected parts of the plan, but ruled in 
favour of the practice of early boundary revision (League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 
126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) [Perry]). 
5 Smith, supra note 1.  
6 Linda Greenhouse, “Supreme Court to Hear Dispute on Redistricting” New York Times (13 
December 2005) A1.  
7 See Adam Cox, “Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics”, Comment, (2004) 79 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 
751 at 772-73; Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000) at 25, 31-47; Daniel Galvin & Colleen Shogan, “Presidential 
Politicization and Centralization across the Modern-Traditional Divide” (2004) 36 Polity 477.  
8 See David E. Lewis, “Presidents and the Politicization of the United States Federal Government, 
1988-2004” (Paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Washington, DC) [unpublished], online: Dartmouth College Department of Government 
<http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/Lewis.pdf>. 
4 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL [Vol. 53 
 
 
bruising marketplace of political rhetoric led by image framers and computer-
modelling professionals.9 
 To some, Canada presents a sharp contrast. Much of the history of Canadian 
politics, including the striking partisanship of the country’s first decades, belies any 
simple comparison.10 Nevertheless, Peter Hogg’s recent claim that Canada’s political 
culture is characterized by “civility and moderation” plausibly describes late 
twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century Canadian politics.11 What, then, has 
sent these two countries in sharply divergent directions in recent decades? In contrast 
with the present landscape in the United States, federal electoral-district readjustment 
in Canada takes place with little public contention and few suggestions of improper 
political motivation.12 Organized by Elections Canada, ten sets of three 
commissioners—one set for each province—work mostly out of sight to redraw the 
boundaries of federal ridings after each decennial census.13 This obscure 
administrative process governs readjustment and enjoys a reputation for 
nonpartisanship when it is thought of at all.  
 
9 See David Lublin & Michael McDonald, “Is It Time to Draw the Line? The Impact of 
Redistricting on Competition in State House Elections” (2006) 5 Election L.J. 144 at 154; Mark 
Monmonier, Bushmanders and Bullwinkles: How Politicians Manipulate Electronic Maps and Census 
Data to Win Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Samuel Issacharoff, 
“Gerrymandering and Political Cartels” (2002) 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593 at 624 [Issacharoff, 
“Gerrymandering”]; Gary C. Jacobson, “Partisan Polarization in Presidential Support: The Electoral 
Connection” (2003) 30 Congress & the Presidency 1. 
10 See R. MacGregor Dawson, “The Gerrymander of 1882” (1935) 1 Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science 197; Peter B. Waite, “Chartered Libertine? A Case Against Sir John 
Macdonald and Some Answers” (1975–76) 3:32 Manitoba Historical Society Transactions, online: 
Manitoba Historical Society <http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/transactions/3/charteredlibertine.shtm?>; 
Terence H. Qualter, The Election Process in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970); W.E. Lyons, 
“Legislative Redistricting by Independent Commissions: Operationalizing the One Man-One Vote 
Doctrine in Canada” (1969) 1 Polity 428 at 432. 
11 Peter Hogg, “Opening Remarks to Ad Hoc Committee on Supreme Court Appointment” (27 
February 2006), online: Department of Justice Canada <http://www.canadajustice.ca/en/dept/pub/ 
scc/jud_interview.html>. Hogg may be right about the politics of such tasks as judicial selections and 
boundary readjustment. He presumably would distinguish these examples from others, such as debates 
on the floors of legislatures, where aggressive and uncivil conduct are inevitably “what comes of 
politics ... in a free society” (David Smith, “A Question of Trust: Parliamentary Democracy in Canada 
Today” (Distinguished Researcher Award Lecture, delivered at the University of Saskatchewan, 22 
October 2003) at 4, online: University of Saskatchewan <http://www.usask.ca/research/about/ 
distinguished_researcher_award/DistResAward.doc>). 
12 See John C. Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) at 8, but notice infrequent exceptions at 144-49; Christopher 
S. Elmendorf, “Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election 
Law” (2005) 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1366 at 1393; Jean-Pierre Kingsley, “The Administration of Canada’s 
Independent, Non-Partisan Approach” (2004) 3 Election L.J. 406 at 406-07; Richard L. Hasen, 
“Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral 
Meltdown” (2005) 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937 at 985.  
13 Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, ss. 4-6 [EBRA]. 
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 This article will look at the problem of “democratic regulation”—the 
interpretation and application of the ground rules of political power in a democracy—
and will turn its attention to Canada’s electoral-district readjustment regime in 
particular. Successes in the Canadian context are striking in light of the pronounced 
risk of partisan conflict. Electoral-district readjustment featured vigorous attempts to 
gerrymander for a full century before the advent of Canada’s Federal Electoral 
Boundaries Commissions (FEBCs).14 Overtly partisan decision making was thus 
previously the rule and remains so in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in some 
provinces with commissions of their own.15 In drawing electoral regions or defining 
other rules of politics, we encounter the risk of “entrenchment”. Lawmakers who 
control the rules of their own election can “chok[e] off the channels of political 
change”16 to remain in office against the “preferences of their constituents.”17 
Democratic regulation therefore raises an acute challenge for institutional design: 
which systems of decision making will best safeguard impartiality despite the 
outsized incentives partisans face to manipulate procedures and lock in their own 
authority? The international and provincial comparisons suggest a significantly more 
complex set of factors at work than the bare presence of commissions or the 
presumptively mild Canadian political culture. 
 Canada’s approach of delegating readjustment to independent administrative 
bodies is a subject of rising interest in U.S. legal commentary. Some American 
scholars have looked for comparative insights from Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia—all countries with independent democratic regulators widely viewed 
as impartial.18 Like other authors, I adopt a comparative perspective. However, I am 
not primarily interested in further lessons for reforming the U.S. regime of democratic 
regulation, but rather focus on what such comparisons recommend for the future of 
Canadian democratic regulation. I begin in broad agreement with Hogg. He appears 
right to characterize cultures of civility and moderation as among the foremost 
safeguards of impartiality in Canadian democratic regulation. However, how 
pervasive are these elements of Canada’s political culture? As the brief history 
outlined above suggests, the impartial readjustment system is a relatively recent—and 
perhaps tenuous—development. Indeed, a number of social scientists describe 
marked Canadian trends of intensifying political contest and declining public trust in 
 
14 See Lyons, supra note 10 at 429. 
15 See text accompanying notes 138, 139. 
16 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1980) at 103.  
17 Michael J. Klarman, “Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem” (1997) 85 Geo. 
L.J. 491 at 498. See also Sam Hirsch, “The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went 
Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting” (2003) 2 Election L.J. 179 at 179; Colin 
Feasby, “Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process” (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 
237. 
18 See Elmendorf, supra note 12 at 1386-1405; Hasen, supra note 12 at 945, 983-90. 
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institutions.19 Do informal norms of political culture then offer a reliable bulwark 
against partisanship? Will they continue to do so given the present atmosphere 
favouring reform of public administration in general20 and readjustment bodies in 
particular?21 These risks take on additional relevance in light of Canadian reformers’ 
inclination to compare and to borrow from the regulatory tools of Canada’s very 
visible neighbour.22  
 Responding to these concerns, this article will assess the use of administrative 
decision making to solve partisanship problems and will ask two main questions. 
First, many recommendations for the reform of readjustment draw on a model of 
formal legal “constraint”23 on partisan behaviour, but is this approach adequate? 
Institutional and legal design based on a constraint model subjects decision makers to 
a host of processes and formal rules in order to limit discretion and the potential for 
its abuse. Oversight bodies therefore closely scrutinize decision making. Additionally, 
numerous clear rules lay out conditions for discretion’s exercise. A question that 
remains wide open is how well traditional scholarship on administrative impartiality, 
most often rooted in constraint models, applies to democratic regulation. I will assert 
that the traditional scholarship must redirect itself in order to address the special 
problems raised by administrative bodies as democratic regulators. Proposals for 
more nuanced design—design sensitive to the complex interactions between law and 
administrative culture in the context of democratic regulation—are better but rarer. 
 
19 David E. Smith, “A Question of Trust: Parliamentary Democracy and Canadian Society” (2004) 
27 Canadian Parliamentary Review 24 at 24-27 (on more polemical Canadian electoral politics); Éric 
Bélanger & Richard Nadeau, “Political Trust and the Vote in Multiparty Elections: The Canadian 
Case” (2005) 44 European Journal of Political Research 121 at 121-25 (on declining Canadian 
political trust); Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, “Political Trust and Trustworthiness” (2000) 3 Annual 
Review of Political Science 475 at 481-83 (citing global declines). Analysts show how trust and 
trustworthiness interdepend, the latter in part a consequence of the self-fulfilling effects of the former. 
See John Braithwaite, “Institutionalizing Distrust, Enculturating Trust,” in Valerie Braithwaite & 
Margaret Levi, eds., Trust and Governance (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) 343 at 344-
47. 
20 See e.g. Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program & Advertising Activities, Restoring 
Accountability, vols. 1-4 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006) [Restoring 
Accountability]; “Harper Promises ‘New Era of Accountability’” CBC News (1 February 2006), 
online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/02/01/harper-gomery-060201. 
html> [“New Era”]; David J. Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), c. 23.C; 
Donald J. Savoie, Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers and Parliament (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003). 
21 See Part II, Section C. 
22 Lorne Sossin, “Boldly Going Where No Law has Gone Before: Call Centres, Intake Scripts, 
Database Fields, and Discretionary Justice in Social Assistance” (2005) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 363 at 
402-03 [Sossin, “Boldly Going”]. 
23 This term appears across several areas of administration and democratic regulation. See e.g. 
Bruce Ackerman, “The New Separation of Powers” (2000) 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633 at 640 (advocating 
the creation of a “democracy branch” for democratic regulation); Denis Galligan, Discretionary 
Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 20 (on judicial 
review of administrative power generally). 
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Though primarily a work of administrative-law scholarship, this article will address a 
special case at the intersection of administrative law and political theory, with 
implications that remain underexamined despite their importance.24 Impartial 
democratic regulation relies, I will assert, not only on formal constraint rules but also 
on informal norms of trust and trustworthiness in a decision-making culture.25 
“Impartiality”, which I will define in detail below, is an instance of trustworthiness. 
 A second question follows from the first. If informal norms are responsible for 
much of the work of political administration, then securing impartiality is particularly 
fraught. Such norms do not readily allow for direct legal manipulation. What, then, 
are our options for regulating the impartiality of democratic administrators? To 
address this question, I will begin with the work of Lawrence Lessig, who some years 
ago offered important additions to the tool kit of cultural regulation. Lessig discussed 
how lawmakers and institutional designers can shape informal norms to pursue 
discrete policy goals.26 But a weakness in Lessig’s approach lies in the restricted set 
of contexts to which he found his own work applying—a set that seems to exclude 
problems as complex as those of impartiality and entrenchment. I will examine one 
particular method to which Lessig makes only tantalizingly cursory reference: the use 
of ambiguity in law.27 In the rich and growing social-science literature on public trust 
and institutional trustworthiness, a subset of works describes types of institutions and 
law that have tended to promote trust and trustworthiness, and a number of 
contributors have begun examining the role of ambiguity. I will draw together these 
disparate contributions and outline how ambiguous institutional and legal design can 
be especially useful in the context of democratic regulation and entrenchment.  
 In this article, then, I will look to electoral-boundary readjustment in practice to 
suggest how ambiguity helps sustain impartiality in Canada’s federal readjustment 
commissions. To be sure, regulatory ambiguity is only one of several plausible 
explanations. However, this underexamined approach appears to have played a 
leading role in the successes of Canadian administrative readjustment. A decision-
making culture characterized by substantial impartiality developed quickly after the 
commissions’ entry into the Canadian political landscape.28 Readjustment thus serves 
as a rich setting in which to explore the regulation of impartiality—with cautionary 
American and provincial comparisons outlining the risks that attend often well-
 
24 Elmendorf expresses surprise at a dearth of scholarship on this issue (supra note 12 at 1376). 
25 For the sake of simplicity, I will use “trust” and “trustworthiness” to stand in for several similar or 
related terms in the literature, such as “civility and moderation” and “social capital”. See generally 
Hogg, supra note 11; Jason Mazzone, “The Social Capital Argument for Federalism” (2001) 11 S. 
Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 27 at 57-58; Putnam, supra note 7 at 19 (“social capital refers to 
connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that 
arise from them”); Richard H. Pildes, “The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law” (1996) 144 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 2055. 
26 Lawrence Lessig, “The Regulation of Social Meaning” (1995) 62 U. Chicago L. Rev. 943. 
27 Ibid. at 1015. 
28 See Lyons, supra note 10 at 458-59. 
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intentioned reforms. In one commissioner’s words, the Canadian system’s recognized 
impartiality is premised on “ambiguity” and on the “mythology ... of the neutral fair 
system.”29 But this state of affairs is “fragile” and “[t]he whole premise can fall apart 
pretty quickly.”30 
 The article will proceed as follows. Part I will provide an overview of 
readjustment procedures in the United States and Canada. Part II will critique the 
reliance on constraint that prevails in proposed reforms of electoral-boundary 
readjustment in recent years. The next two parts will then look more closely at the 
two national readjustment systems, examining how different institutional models 
impact impartiality. Part III will outline alternatives to constraint in institutional 
design, focusing in particular on ambiguity. Finally, Part IV will consider the limits of 
ambiguity approaches, detailing the range of cases in which these methods can 
improve the impartiality of democratic regulation. 
I. Background: Two National Readjustment Systems 
A. U.S. Readjustment 
 In the United States, systems for drawing electoral districts for the federal House 
of Representatives vary from state to state. State legislatures most often readjust 
federal boundaries through normal acts of legislation.31 However, some states give 
commissions control over readjustment. These commissions are often politicized: 
membership is usually split between commissioners affiliated with the United States’ 
two main political parties, either equally or in proportion to the parties’ legislative 
representation, and commissioners typically promote the interests of their party.32 A 
few apparently non-partisan state commissions offer intriguing exceptions.33 
 There is federal administrative oversight of readjustment to the extent that the 
Voting Rights Act of 196534 gives a group of lawyers in the United States Justice 
Department the task of preclearing proposed electoral-rule changes.35 The lawyers vet 
the changes, looking for deleterious impacts on the voting patterns of historically 
 
29 Interview of Ritu Khullar, Federal Electoral Boundaries Commissioner (Alberta) (28 September 
2006) [unpublished, on file with author]. See also Interview of Ron Landes, Federal Electoral 
Boundaries Commissioner (Nova Scotia) (24 July–12 September 2006) [unpublished, on file with 
author]; Interview of David Smith, Federal Electoral Boundaries Commissioner (Saskatchewan) (9 
August 2007) [unpublished, on file with author]; Interviews of four Federal Electoral Boundaries 
Commissioners preferring anonymity (2006–07) [unpublished, on file with author]. 
30 Khullar, ibid. 
31 See generally Michael P. McDonald, “A Comparative Analysis of Redistricting Institutions in the 
United States, 2001–02” (2004) 4 State Politics and Policy Quarterly 371.  
32 Ibid. 
33 See ibid. 
34 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000) [VRA].  
35 Ibid., s. 5. 
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disadvantaged groups.36 The preclearance process applies to nine states in their 
entirety, most of which are in the South, and to parts of seven more states scattered 
across the country.37 Justice Department lawyers can approve the proposed changes or 
refer cases deemed suspect for final determination by the courts. Under a separate 
process of the VRA, litigants in all states can refer cases to the federal courts without 
Justice Department involvement.38 
 Litigation occurs often.39 The Supreme Court of the United States laid down new 
gerrymandering tests in every decade from the 1960s to the 2000s. Beginning with 
the establishment of justiciability40 and the rule of one person, one vote,41 the court 
repeatedly augmented or replaced earlier rules. Newer rules have included a strict test 
for declining numbers of elected representatives from minority groups,42 a prohibition 
on any district “bizarre on its face”,43 and a test for declining minority-group 
representation in light of the “totality of the circumstances”.44 However, the case law 
and the power to enforce the VRA rest on the equality protections of the 
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment45 rather than any wider-ranging guarantee of 
impartiality.46 
B. Canadian Readjustment 
 Canada has adopted a different set of legal solutions. At the federal level, the 
Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act,47 certain constitutional provisions,48 a 
handful of court decisions,49 and assorted customary rules50 govern readjustment. An 
 
36 See ibid. 
37 28 C.F.R. § 51, App. (2007). 
38 Supra note 34, s. 2. 
39 See Pamela S. Karlan, “The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census” (1998) 50 
Stan. L. Rev. 731 at 762 [Karlan, “Fire”]. 
40 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
41 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
42 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 at 208ff. (1976). 
43 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 at 644 (1993). 
44 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 at 480 (2003). 
45 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
46 See Issacharoff, “Gerrymandering,” supra note 9 at 598, 600. 
47 Supra note 13. 
48 See Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 8 (requiring a census of the population of 
Canada in 1871 and every ten years thereafter), s. 40 (setting out initial ridings at Confederation), s. 51 
(requiring readjustment of House of Commons seat totals, and apportionment to the various provinces, 
following the decennial census; therefore implicitly mandating electoral map adjustment), s. 51A 
(requiring that every province have no fewer House of Commons seats than it has Senate seats), s. 52 
(granting Parliament power to expand the total number of House of Commons seats), reprinted in 
R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
49 For a discussion of court decisions, see text accompanying note 143. 
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administrative body, Elections Canada, has jurisdiction over most electoral issues, 
from readjustment to the oversight of campaigns.51 The thirty members of the FEBCs 
do the work of readjustment across the country, guided at arm’s length by Elections 
Canada. For every province there is one commission made up of three 
commissioners. The province’s chief justice appoints a judge to chair the commission, 
while the Speaker of the House of Commons appoints the other two members from 
among the province’s residents. Once constituted, each commission prepares 
proposals while drawing on Elections Canada resources. Notices invite public and 
parliamentary participation in open hearings after publication of the proposals. This 
period sees (a) the Speaker of the House of Commons table the proposed ridings in a 
committee of the House of Commons, (b) a thirty-day period of availability for 
review by MPs and the filing of objections, (c) a further thirty-day period of evidence 
collection and review by the committee, (d) the return of the proposal to the Chief 
Electoral Officer and thereafter the provincial commissions, and (e) a final thirty-day 
period during which the commissions render their final decisions independently of, 
but with attention to, Parliament and any public input that was received.52 At the 
conclusion of hearings commissioners usually modify their proposals. The 
commissions then enact the final boundaries by regulation.53 
 While a handful of court decisions in Canada address boundary drawing, few 
spell out substantive criteria for readjustment.54 The number of all readjustment cases 
is small in comparison with American litigation, even allowing for differences of size 
between the two countries. The leading Canadian case is the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Reference Re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan),55 which 
considers the right to vote under Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms56 and outlines criteria for electoral-boundary drawing. Criteria include 
“geography, community history, community interests and minority representation”,57 
as well as “practical considerations” like the difficulty of legislators in fulfilling their 
“ombudsman” problem-solving roles across vast northern ridings.58 This “list is not 
closed,”59 and the deeper set of values that govern the process include “effective 
                                                                                                                                       
50 See e.g. Louis Massicotte, Establishing the Rules of the Game: Election Laws in Democracies 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) at 97-98 (outlining customs such as joint selection of the 
chief electoral officer by all political parties). 
51 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 13-21 [CEA]. The CEA creates the offices of the Chief 
Electoral Officer and his or her staff (ibid.). Much of the remainder of the CEA details their 
responsibilities. 
52 EBRA, supra note 13, ss. 3-6, 14, 19-25. 
53 Ibid., ss. 24-25. 
54 See text accompanying notes 141-43. 
55 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, (sub nom. Reference re Electoral Boundaries Commission Act) 81 D.L.R. 
(4th) 16 [Carter cited to S.C.R.]. 
56 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[Charter]. 
57 Carter, supra note 55 at 184. 
58 Ibid. at 187-88.  
59 Ibid. at 184. 
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representation,”60 as well as “respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, 
commitment to social justice and equality, respect for cultural and group identity, and 
faith in social and political institutions that enhance the participation of individuals in 
society.”61 The EBRA lays out some similar substantive guidelines for federal 
readjustment. The “rules” to be followed include “the community of interest or 
community of identity in or the historical pattern of an electoral district in the 
province ... and a manageable geographic size for districts in sparsely populated, rural 
or northern regions of the province.”62 These rules are both general readjustment 
criteria and the criteria that govern departures from the statute’s one person, one vote 
default where the commission considers “such a departure necessary or desirable.”63  
C. Impartiality as the Goal of Readjustment 
 From these background notes, a distinction between the aims of each national 
system begins to emerge. Impartial judgment is a primary goal of electoral-boundary 
readjustment schemes in both Canada and the United States.64 However, each country 
leans toward one of two separate notions of impartiality.65 The first notion is one of 
“balance”. Impartiality in U.S. democratic regulation is most often understood as the 
product of finely tuned tensions, between the two pre-eminent political parties66 or 
between contending social factions, especially white versus black or Latino.67 An 
impartial decision is therefore generally an average or a compromise between 
opposing partisan groups. This generalization appears to hold true in most but not all 
states.68 
 
60 Ibid. at 172. 
61 Ibid. at 188. 
62 Supra note 13 at s. 15(2)(a, b).  
63 Ibid. Except in exceptional circumstances, no district should range beyond plus or minus 25 per 
cent of the average size of all districts. Note that in practice in a given district, deviation from the 
average is the rule (Landes, supra note 29). 
64 Issacharoff notes that the gerrymandering doctrines elaborated by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, while premised on constitutional anti-discrimination doctrines, are driven by the Court’s 
broader but inchoate sense of the unfairness of entrenchment (Issacharoff, “Gerrymandering”, supra 
note 9 at 598, 600). Partisan entrenchment is an extreme example of partiality. 
65 This is a useful but simplifying dichotomy necessarily omitting other potential definitions. 
66 Often we see assertions such as that of O’Connor J. in her concurring opinion in Davis v. 
Bandemer: “There is no proof before us that political gerrymandering is an evil that cannot be 
checked or cured by the people or by the parties themselves” (478 U.S. 109 at 152 (1986) 
[Bandemer]). Thus even when impartiality appears for the moment to have been abandoned in 
practice, the opposing party or electorate will perhaps even the score in time. The success of 
Democrats in the 2006 mid-term election offers some support for this perspective. 
67 See Issacharoff, “Gerrymandering”, supra note 9 at 598, 600. 
68 See generally McDonald, supra note 31. As I will show, impartiality as balance pervades most 
American scholarship on readjustment. However, readjustment in certain exceptional states is in 
practice more in line with the second notion of impartiality. 
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 A second understanding of impartiality is more robust, if harder to conceptualize 
and put into practice. Impartiality according to this definition means a lack of 
attachment to or predisposition toward an interest, ideology or social or political 
faction.69 In addition, impartiality in this sense is usually broader-ranging. It implies a 
lack of partiality not only along one or a few dimensions—such as Democratic and 
Republican—but along many. For example, Canada’s FEBC process apparently 
avoids no particular form of partiality, but is rather geared toward decision making 
that is generally without favour—for example, to a given party, ideology, region, or 
ethnic or linguistic group.70  
 The latter of the two notions is not only more robust, but perhaps also truer to 
what we usually mean in speaking of impartiality. One might question whether 
decisions emerging from highly polarized decision-making bodies—bodies where 
partial decision makers serve as mutual counterweights—are properly understood as 
impartial at all.71 In these cases, individual decision makers are certainly not 
conceived of as impartial, though their collective decisions sometimes are. The notion 
of a compromise between factions suggests a negotiated result. In contrast, the ideal 
of “broad” impartiality—and it is surely only an ideal72—implies rational judgment, 
not arbitrary agreement between partial decision makers.73 On the broader of the two 
notions, impartial decision making takes into account most of the relevant 
 
69 There are many formulations along these lines, citing impartiality as avoidance by decision 
makers of politics, policy, partisanship, and personal preference. See e.g. Hasen, supra note 12 at 979, 
982; Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 8, 10 [Rosen, Democratic Branch]; Kenneth Kernaghan, “Political Rights 
and Political Impartiality: Finding the Balance Point” (1986) 29 Canadian Public Administration 639; 
Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69, 82 D.L.R. (4th) 321; Lublin & McDonald, 
supra note 9 at 156. Note that “neutrality” often connotes something similar. 
70 This calls for some further explanation. The major point is that “broader-ranging” impartiality 
avoids favouring not one or two, but several or many social groupings. However, in Canada, regions 
and ethnic and linguistic groupings are in fact important in the decision-making process; as will be 
seen, they are often kept intact when electoral boundaries are drawn. But the regime gears toward 
preserving such groups generally, rather than favouring one group over others.  
71 An example is the Supreme Court of the United States, whose members frequently organize into 
two camps separated by a wide ideological gulf (Frank I. Michelman, “Suspicion, or the New Prince” 
(2001) 68 U. Chicago L. Rev. 679 at 680 [Michelman, “Suspicion”]). 
72 The FEBCs are inevitably imperfect. However, as discussed in this article, having chosen the 
more idealistic of two potential meanings of impartiality, Canada’s FEBCs are substantially impartial 
in practice.  
73 In concrete terms, evenly divided partisan commissioners commonly draw boundaries that 
maintain the status quo in the legislature (e.g. 40 Democrats, 40 Republicans). See generally 
McDonald, supra note 31. Alternatively, a slight majority of one party on a commission can push 
through significant changes (now e.g. 45 Democrats, 35 Republicans). Such variability demonstrates 
how decision making by partisan balance can be arbitrary, in the sense that community history or 
other rational readjustment criteria play a reduced role. 
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perspectives and substantive factors bearing on an issue.74 An ethic of broadly 
impartial decision making entails, at a minimum, that decision makers commit to 
hearing and rationally considering the full range of relevant facts and arguments. 
Unless otherwise indicated, I will use the broader meaning of impartiality from here 
on. 
 Neither of these definitions is uncontroversial.75 However, they provide some 
context as we turn to the approaches Canada and the United States have adopted in 
efforts to ensure impartial readjustment. 
II. Regulating Impartiality in Traditional Administrative Law 
 Administrative law and scholarship recognize several safeguards for impartiality. 
These safeguards appear substantially unaltered in much of the literature on 
readjustment administered by commissions. But as I will demonstrate in this part, the 
traditional safeguards are insensitive to or muddle the distinctive problems of 
administration in the context of democratic regulation.  
A. Impartiality in Traditional Administrative Law 
 Administrative law and commentary commonly make reference to at least six 
impartiality safeguards. (1) Transparency. Open views of the decision-making 
processes of agencies, commissions, and the like are thought necessary for 
impartiality.76 Abuses of power might be less likely under the light of scrutiny.77 And 
revealing internal procedures can lead to more rational decision making.78 (2) Public 
Participation. A right of members of the public with relevant interests to speak at 
hearings is understood in part as an impartiality safeguard. The contributions of 
individuals and groups from civil society can enhance the impartiality of procedures 
 
74 See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law” (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 
91 at 107; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras. 
47-48, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Baker cited to S.C.R.]. 
75 Of the various kinds of partialities that broad impartiality, as noted above, might lack, ideology is 
the most difficult and contentious. On a basic level, ideology is unavoidable because laws express 
ideologies, as do the character and the constitution—in all senses of the word—of a state. However, 
impartiality means avoiding, in particular, narrow or rigid ideology. The primary ideology to which 
impartial decision makers should be committed is intellectual openness (Nedelsky, ibid.).  
76 See Keith Hawkins, “The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science” in 
Keith Hawkins, ed., The Uses of Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 11; Restoring 
Accountability, supra note 20; Baker, supra note 74 at paras. 35-44; Mullan, supra note 20, c. 23. 
77 See Northwestern Utilities Limited v. Edmonton (City of), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 684 at 706, 89 D.L.R. 
(3d) 161; Baker, supra note 74 at para. 38. 
78 See Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 2 F.C. 646 at para. 38, 
147 D.L.R. (4th) 93 (C.A.) [Williams cited to F.C.]; Baker, ibid. at para. 39; Mullan, supra note 20 at 
c.13.O.3. 
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by broadening the range of views available to decision makers.79 Public participation 
also supports transparency.80 (3) Representativeness. According to some views, 
decision makers should reflect in their own ranks the distribution of perspectives or 
identities in the society they serve. Broadly representative bodies accommodate 
interests beyond those of the mainstream or elites.81 (4) Independence. Impartiality is 
commonly understood as requiring administrators to decide in independent settings, 
without fear of sanction or other interference from influential partisans.82 In addition, 
the rule that no one should be a judge in their own cause disqualifies decision makers 
who have “an interest in [a] case through a social, economic, or political relationship 
with one of the parties to the dispute.”83 (5) Reconsideration and Review. Recourse to 
further decision making by the same or different decision makers, allowing 
consideration of claims of bias or denial of other procedural guarantees, is a further 
impartiality safeguard.84 (6) Rational Organization, Simplicity, and Clarity. The rules 
guiding administrative discretion should, a final argument goes, be rationally 
organized, simple, and clear; power should be centralized and coordinated and there 
should be a “framework of constraining principles”85 at work. In contrast, relatively 
chaotic administration obscures the channels of, and responsibility for, decision-
making. Clarity and coherence, cost-benefit analyses, and top-down control produce 
rational arrays of rules and accountable decision-making.86 
 
79 Participatory rights—for example, rights to notice and an opportunity to respond—can ensure that 
decision makers hear from all affected individuals. In courts and some administrative tribunals, the 
natural justice rule of audi alteram partem requires, inter alia, on notice, an open hearing “before the 
decision-maker” (Hon. Hugh F. Landerkin, “Custody Disputes in the Provincial Court of Alberta: A 
New Judicial Dispute Resolution Model” (1997) 35 Alta. L. Rev. 627 at 654). See also Mullan, ibid. at 
675; Frank I. Michelman, “Brennan and Democracy: The 1996-97 Brennan Center Symposium 
Lecture” (1998) 86 Cal. L. Rev. 399 at 423 [Michelman, “Brennan”]. 
80 See Jean-Luc Bilodeau, “La participation des administrés à l’élaboration des normes de portée 
générale dans le cadre de la régulation du marché des valeurs mobilières” (1999) 33 R.J.T. 449 at para. 
30. 
81 See Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration” (2001) 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 at 2264-66. Note 
that representativeness may conflict with independence and the rule of nemo judex in parte sua. 
82 See Lorne Sossin, “Speaking Truth to Power? The Search for Bureaucratic Independence in 
Canada” (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 1 at 2, 6-15, 19-24 [Sossin, “Truth to Power”]; International 
Woodworkers of America, Local 2-69 v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd., [1980] S.C.R. 282 at 
332-33, 68 D.L.R. (4th) 524. 
83 K.D. Ewing, “A Theory of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Accountable and 
Independent Judiciary” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 312 at 314 (on the rule of nemo judex in parte sua). 
This is also a rule of administrative justice “commonly known as the rule against bias” (Landerkin, 
supra note 79 at 654). 
84 See Mullan, supra note 20 at 675.  
85 Denis Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986) at 20. See also Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Text, 3d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 
1972) at 226. 
86 See Sossin, “Truth to Power”, supra note 82 at 2 (civil service “rules, principles and conventions” 
should be “more fully elaborated”); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, “Reinventing the 
Regulatory State” (1995) 62 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1 at 8. 
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B. The Case of Democratic Regulation 
 The impartiality safeguards noted above, all based on a model of formal 
constraint of discretion, apply in a straightforward manner to much of the normal 
business of administrative regulation, such as standard making or adjudication on the 
environment, immigration and refugee claims, health, and much more. This changes 
when administrative decision makers are not just another set of organs elaborating 
and implementing the policies of government, but are regulators of government itself. 
It is important to consider exactly how thinking about impartiality should change 
when administrators serve in this way as branches of government; though we 
commonly call them governmental branches,87 administrators fully assume this status 
only when they are integral units in a system of mutual regulation—capable of 
directing power and not merely receiving direction.88 By regulating politics, 
administrators cease being discrete decision makers hived off from more senior power 
holders and instead share space at the peak of governmental hierarchy.89  
 How, then, should the constellation of impartiality safeguards outlined above 
differ in the case of democratic regulation? As already noted, some observers view 
informal norms of trust and trustworthiness as the indispensable safeguards of 
impartiality in democratic regulation. Trust at its most basic level is an expectation of 
good conduct by decision makers.90 The expectation can be held by an individual or 
in common by members of the public.91 Trust in the context of electoral-boundary 
readjustment is an expectation of impartiality, and impartial processes of democratic 
regulation are trustworthy processes.92 A useful resource in the design of impartial 
institutions is therefore the sizeable literature characterizing norms of trust and 
trustworthiness. Such norms are informal, richly complex, and widely varied. They 
are informal in the sense that no ceremony marks their creation or evolution, and 
nowhere are they set down in writing. The literature describes public trust in and 
trustworthiness of political institutions as taking the forms of rules, values, and 
 
87 See e.g. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 598, 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174, 1 W.W.R. 577 [Dolphin Delivery cited to S.C.R.]. 
88 This is similar to the dialectical power relations among the traditional branches: executive, 
legislative, and judicial.  
89 Though decision making entrusted to democratic regulators is ostensibly limited to boundary 
drawing or other discrete political rule making tasks, influence over electoral outcomes represents an 
open-ended power to steer general policy in certain directions. Administrative democratic regulators 
are perhaps weaker than other branches of government, given that the former exercise an indirect and 
intermittent power. However, the regulators’ substantive influence is potentially broad at these 
intermittent junctures. Their influence also persists and is generally irreversible over several electoral 
cycles; on this temporal scale, their power surpasses that of legislatures, executives, and sometimes 
courts. 
90 See Karen Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude” (1996) 107 Ethics 4 at 5. 
91 See Philip Pettit, “Republican Theory and Political Trust” in Braithwaite & Levi, supra note 19, 
295 at 296-99.  
92 See Tom Tyler, “Trust and Democratic Governance” in Braithwaite & Levi, supra note 19, 269 at 
269-70. To be sure, there are several alternative definitions of trust that are relevant in other contexts. 
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symbols,93 as well as social meanings94 and agreements,95 and social bonds, networks, 
organizations, and loyalties.96 These norms help determine which forms of politics 
will gain public favour or disfavour: civil versus polemic; moderate versus extreme; 
impartial versus partisan.  
 Although their origins are obscure and their nature is diverse and intangible, 
norms of trust and trustworthiness may steer decision makers toward impartiality 
more powerfully than other kinds of rules. This suggestion appears implicitly but 
strongly in the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach of hands-off judicial review in 
Carter,97 the Court’s last decision on boundary drawing and one that now largely 
belongs to a bygone era. Indeed, the notion that impartial democratic regulation 
primarily relies on trust and trustworthiness seems to be on the wane in Canada. 
Reforms increasingly fixate on the more tangible methods of regulating politics, 
especially those subjecting discretion to clear and rational arrays of rules. As I outline 
in Section C, most newer works on administrative approaches to readjustment feature 
the conventional raft of impartiality safeguards. Authors focus more on constraint 
tools such as transparency, accountability, and democratic scrutiny than on trust and 
trustworthiness.98 The Canadian author Mark Carter has asserted a “need for a 
Charter jurisprudence” to elaborate rules for and “more clearly restrict” the 
management of legislative readjustment according to a “more consistent vision” that 
“promises to structure and place limits upon the scope of interpretive discretion.”99 
The courts have generally not fulfilled his wish. However, as discussed below, in the 
years since Carter, courts have toyed with tightening the decision’s loose “effective 
 
93 See Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) at 2. 
94 See ibid.; Lessig, supra note 26. 
95 See Daniel Fitzpatrick, “Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World 
Tragedy of Contested Access” (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 996 at 1001, 1003. 
96 Trust and trustworthiness are, in a word, “polynormative” (ibid. at 1001). On the widely varied 
forms into which trust and trustworthiness solidify, see e.g. Levi & Stoker, supra note 19; Francis 
Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995) at 
26; Putnam, supra note 7 at 19-22; Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) at 39. With some simplification, the rubric of “norms” captures these many forms. 
97 Carter, supra note 55 at 185 (adopting a flexible “effective representation” language and 
assuming fair readjustment by provincial riding redistribution commissions, even absent strict judicial 
oversight). 
98 See e.g. Restoring Accountability, supra note 20; “New Era”, supra note 20; Mullan, supra note 
20; Savoie, supra note 20; Sossin, “Boldly Going”, supra note 22 (citing other works); Michael 
Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 51-52; Mark Carter, 
“Reconsidering the Charter and Electoral Boundaries” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 53 at 59-60, 71; Canada, 
House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Procedure 
and House Affairs, vols. 1-4 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1995) 
[Milliken Report]; Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral 
Democracy, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), c. 7 [Lortie Report]. 
99 Carter, ibid. 
2008] R. LEVY – ELECTORAL-BOUNDARY POLITICS 17 
 
 
representation” standard. And a series of proposals and studies on readjustment have 
applied pressure for tighter constraints. 
 The main assumptions behind these efforts are twofold. First, administrators 
tasked with regulating politics will tend to hoard power for themselves or their allies. 
Second, these administrators must therefore be subject to limits on their authority. 
These assumptions should be uncontroversial at a basic level. And indeed they enjoy 
a celebrated pedigree: rooted in the liberal tradition, the constraint model has long 
informed the design of political institutions such as those of the United States, 
England, and Canada.100 But the approach is problematic if we push it too far, and 
especially if it crowds out alternative approaches to regulation.  
 There are at least three reasons why constraint can be inadequate in the context of 
democratic regulation. First, focusing on constraint rather than trust and 
trustworthiness has often simply been futile. Three of the most compelling American 
critics of constraint tools in democratic regulation are Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela 
Karlan, and Gerald Rosenberg. Each shows that constraint approaches have not 
worked or will likely cease to work.101 Issacharoff and Karlan use the metaphor of 
hydraulics to evoke the tendency of electoral-campaign financing or partisanship, for 
example, to flow out of the formal legal channels that are designed as constraints.102 
Issacharoff goes so far as to recommend against the renewal of the VRA’s Justice 
Department review provisions,103 which had been set to expire in 2007.104 In his view, 
the most serious exclusions of African Americans and other minority groups from 
political participation are now mostly at an end. Issacharoff therefore argues that the 
system of VRA scrutiny from above now only stunts the development of a mature 
 
100 For early literature on the two constraint assumptions see e.g. Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison & John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. by Isaac Kramnick (London: Penguin, 1987), No. 48 
(Madison) at 309 [The Federalist] (noting “the encroaching spirit of power”); ibid., No. 47 (Madison) 
at 303. The Federalists were animated by a dark vision of the “nature of man” (ibid., No. 10 
(Madison) at 124). See also Thomas Hobbes, De Cive or The Citizen (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1949); David Hume, “Of the Independency of Parliament” in Essays: Moral, Political and 
Literary (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) 40. Even Magna Carta originally came with an 
oversight council of 25 barons (Magna Carta, 1215, c. 61, translation reprinted in J.C. Holt, Magna 
Carta (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965) at Appendix IV). See also, more recently, 
Ignatieff, supra note 98 at 52. 
101 The authors use varying terminologies suggesting the notion of constraint. See e.g. Issacharoff, 
“Gerrymandering,” supra note 9 at 612 (advocating a “rescue” of U.S. doctrines on gerrymandering 
from “constricting language”). 
102 Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela Karlan, “The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform” (1999) 77 
Tex. L. Rev. 1705 at 1713-15. See also David Butler & Bruce Cain, Congressional Redistricting: 
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives (New York: Macmillan, 1992) at 149-50. 
103 VRA, supra note 34, s. 5. 
104 Congress renewed the VRA in 2006 (Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Loretta Scott King 
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577).  
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Southern politics that transcends race.105 For his part, Rosenberg collects a number of 
studies on judicial control of electoral-boundary readjustment that cover the period in 
the Warren Court era when readjustment became a justiciable issue and judges 
stepped forcefully into the field. Rosenberg concludes that there was at best a 
“spotty” record of actual reform.106 Only some states experienced increases in 
legislator turnover and saw their assemblies undergo shifts in party distribution.107 
Most famously, some legislatures, stripped of the power to map out unequal districts, 
turned instead to gerrymandering within the new constraints imposed and enforced by 
the courts.108  
 Constraint can be especially ineffective at governing democratic regulators, for 
whom entrenchment is a constant temptation. Entrenchment is a concern for 
boundary readjustment, campaign-financing regulation, constitutional amendment, 
judicial selections, and any other area where decision makers can both make and 
benefit from significant changes to procedural rules.109 Additionally, impartiality in 
democratic regulation markedly defies clear definition,110 which is a requirement for 
any workable formal legal rule against partisanship in democratic regulation. 
 
105 See Samuel Issacharoff, “Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?” 
(2004) 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1710 at 1714 [Issacharoff, “Section 5”]. With the VRA’s early successes in 
enforcing African-American voting rights, new black voters became an easily identified population 
that was overwhelmingly Democratic, and race became a marker enabling party-based 
gerrymandering. 
106 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993) at 298. The Supreme Court of the United States first found the 
readjustment issue to be justiciable, under selected conditions, in Baker v. Carr (supra note 40). 
107 See Rosenberg, ibid. at 296-303. See generally Richard G. Niemi & Laura R. Winsky, “The 
Persistence of Partisan Redistricting Effects in Congressional Elections in the 1970s and 1980s” 
(1992) 54 Journal of Politics 565 at 571. 
108 Rosenberg, ibid. at 301. 
109 Changes that are “significant” are those that are long-lasting, self-perpetuating, or otherwise 
important. Electoral-boundary manipulation is a good example of all three: it is long-lasting because 
readjustment normally occurs on a ten-year cycle; it is self-perpetuating because a political party 
elected with help from gerrymandered districts can be well positioned to continue manipulating 
boundaries; and it is important because general elections determine the policy directions of the state. 
Note also that some decisions benefit not the decision makers—at least not directly—but their 
political party.  
110 See Peter Schuck, “The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of 
Politics” (1987) 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1325 at 1345-48; Issacharoff, “Gerrymandering,” supra note 9 at 
596, 602-05. Some rules constrain governmental abuse that is not political but rather personal, such as 
accepting bribes or taking government funds for personal use. See e.g. F.C. DeCoste, “Political 
Corruption, Judicial Selection, and the Rule of Law” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 654 at 672-73 
(discussing personal versus public corruption). These forms of abuse are relatively easy to define, if 
not always crystal clear. But we are harder pressed to define the conduct that a constraint rule against 
political partisanship would disallow. A straightforward legal prohibition against partisanship can have 
some success: judges might easily spot the most egregious results of partisanship in decision making, 
such as the outline of the 25th congressional district of Texas. But most cases are harder cases. Courts 
in the United States at one time attempted to fashion direct rules against partisan gerrymandering, but 
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 How does the problem of ineffective constraints apply to readjustment 
commissions? Authors proposing new commissions generally expect the bodies 
themselves to serve as constraints on governmental powers.111 Like the constraints 
described by Issacharoff, Karlan, and Rosenberg, commission proposals place 
excessive faith in the ability of new decision-making organs to readjust electoral 
boundaries impartially.112 Some authors recognize that new decision-making bodies 
face the same risks as the old, and that domination of commission membership by 
partisans may still occur.113 But examples below will suggest how reform projects 
favouring new readjustment bodies typically reflect faith in more, rather than better, 
procedure to thwart entrenchment and partisanship. Even authors who declare 
themselves wary of entrenchment on commissions make this error. I do not mean to 
overstate the tendency toward governmental abuse of discretion; indeed, my own 
focus on trust solutions to entrenchment problems suggests that the fear of such abuse 
in Canada is often overestimated. The point of the present criticism is that new 
decision-making branches per se do not secure impartiality or avoid entrenchment, 
notwithstanding the popularity of this assumption. To be sure, entrenchment in a 
system of more, rather than fewer, branches of government takes more effort, as it is 
harder to spread entrenchment across many branches. But perhaps equally, more 
branches also present more potential points of origin of entrenchment.114 
                                                                                                                                       
have all but given up trying after almost two decades of effort. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 
124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) [Vieth]. Not long before Vieth, the Supreme Court of the United States had 
ruled in Bandemer that the issue of partisan gerrymandering was justiciable (supra note 66). But the 
same court in Vieth considered ensuing efforts to define workable partisanship tests unsuccessful. 
Nevertheless, the court allowed that judges could keep trying. 
111 This point requires some clarification. Commissions inevitably “constrain” lawmakers by 
depriving the latter of powers to decide on the rules that govern, for example, their own elections. This 
is constraining or limiting a power, rather than eliminating or replacing it, because lawmakers 
typically retain some role in the process—appointing members, making submissions before 
commissions, or attempting to influence readjustment commissions. 
112 See e.g. Jeffrey Rosen, “Divided Suffrage” (1995) 12 Const. Commentary 199 [Rosen, 
“Divided”] at 201. 
113 Elmendorf, supra note 12; McDonald, supra note 31 at 385-91. Note that “entrenchment”, 
defined above as the manipulation of rules by political insiders to avoid electoral defeat, is a matter of 
degree. In Canada and the United States, for all the risks that electoral-system manipulation poses, we 
are still far from outright domination of politics by a single party. The risk is rather one of significant 
mismatch between popular preferences and electoral outcomes, due to the conscious manipulation of 
political-process rules. 
114 Domination of any single branch can spread to some or all of the other branches. In the recent 
history of the United States, we have seen much creeping entrenchment of this kind: from a majority 
Republican Senate, which confirmed conservative judges (based on the advice and consent power to 
vet judicial nominees); from the judiciary (and governorships) to the presidency (e.g., in the 
partisanship of the 2000 Florida presidential recount and the subsequent Supreme Court of the United 
States opinion); from the presidency to the judiciary (e.g., at the Supreme Court of the United States); 
and from the presidency and judiciary to the House of Representatives (e.g. in the increased 
partisanship of the Department of Justice and in a weakening gerrymandering jurisprudence, both of 
which give freer reign to Congressional district gerrymandering). These chains of influence represent 
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 The second problem with constraint is that the approach is not only commonly 
ineffective, but can also diminish trust. Trust and trustworthiness in governance may 
be incompatible with law and procedure strongly symbolizing distrust and the 
inevitability of partisanship.115 Some legal constraints will always be necessary.116 But 
while governmental abuse is inevitable, the relevant question is how prevalent 
incidents of abuse are, and what therefore the nature and level of the response should 
be. On sober examination we should find that in fashioning constraints that are not 
sensitive to the degree of risk, we craft remedies that are worse than the risks 
themselves. This tendency appears to be strongest after revelations of significant 
abuses of governmental powers, as in the case of Canada’s federal-unity sponsorship 
program of 1995–2003.117 Constraint solutions, taken too far, can assume away law’s 
potential to produce impartial decisions.118 Examples in the next section will illustrate 
this point. In a system dominated by constraint and symbolizing distrust, there is little 
room for the complex and intangible norms of trust and trustworthiness that can 
sustain impartiality.119  
 Third and finally, the elaboration of new procedural rules based on the constraint 
model often steers political decision making and discourse away from substantive 
                                                                                                                                       
the translation of even transient majorities—for example, in the Senate, courts or governorships—into 
majorities, in other branches, that resist easy reversal. See e.g. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, 
“Understanding the Constitutional Revolution” (2001) 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045 at 1085-86. See also 
Rosen, Democratic Branch, supra note 69 at 4. Reversing a course toward entrenchment can require 
extraordinary shifts in popular party support, exceeding thresholds set artificially high by 
gerrymandered districts or other obstacles in election laws (Lublin & McDonald, supra note 9 at 156). 
115 See Braithwaite, supra note 19 at 351. 
116 Methods relying on constraint and trust in institutional design often coexist. For example, in 
Carter, the Supreme Court of Canada does not abandon all commitment to reviewing readjustment 
commissions for abuses of power, but rather commits only to giving the commissions considerable 
leeway (supra note 51). 
117 This corruption scandal prompted changes in the regulation of the conduct of government. See 
Restoring Accountability, supra note 20. Another case is the now-defunct Special Prosecutor law 
passed in the United States after Watergate. During the Clinton administration, Congress allowed the 
law to quietly expire, having seen it bring a culture of scrutiny in U.S. government to regrettable 
extremes. Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr’s investigation of the so-called Whitewater affair set up 
the conditions for Clinton’s unsuccessful impeachment—a high-water mark of partisan political 
combat in the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 599; Mark Tushnet, “The New Constitutional Order and 
the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration” (1999) 113 Harv. L. Rev. 29 at 59-61 (analyzing the 
impeachment and its partisan origins). 
118 See Khullar, supra note 29 (“so long as people believe in the myth [of impartiality], and govern 
themselves accordingly, then the myth becomes a reality”). 
119 Braithwaite claims that “[t]here are grave dangers in following the advice of Thomas Hobbes 
and David Hume and designing institutions that are fit for knaves, based on distrust. The trouble with 
institutions that assume that people ... will not be virtuous is that they destroy virtue” (supra note 19 at 
351 [endnotes omitted]). Interestingly, Hume was also an early theorist of trust, viewing—like many 
modern writers—trust as facilitating complex forms of social and state action. In a culture where 
significant distrust prevails, we do not risk such undertakings (David Hume, A Treatise on Human 
Nature, ed. by David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 189). 
See also Pildes, supra note 25. 
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considerations, such as the geography, community history, and minority-
representation criteria for electoral-boundary readjustment. Instead, constraint 
engenders a fixation on process. New constraint rules are meant to limit the leeway 
for partisan decision making and entrenchment. But because political combatants, as 
noted, manage to steer around constraints, elaborating new rules of constraint often 
does little more than shift the locus of political battles. Conflict resumes under these 
new and often narrower procedural rules. Manipulating procedural constraints can 
then become a main focus of political energies.120 This was starkly illustrated in the 
United States as President George W. Bush revealed his intentions to appoint 
ideological partisans to federal appellate courts in 2004–05. Once vacancies opened 
on these courts, partisan conflict on the matter began, centering first around the 
possibility of a vote on the Senate floor and moving quickly to the issue of minority 
filibustering. In response to the possibility of filibusters, Republican senators, who 
were in the majority at the time, threatened changes to Senate filibuster rules. 
However, a bipartisan “Gang of Fourteen” centrist senators then agreed to vote 
against changes to filibuster procedures except in “extraordinary circumstances”—
thereby laying down a rule governing rules governing filibusters governing judicial 
appointments.121 Later the contest over judicial appointments edged toward a fifth layer 
of rule making, as debate turned to the boundaries of “extraordinary circumstances”.122 
In debate among politicians and in broader public discourse, the appointments 
controversy now focused on this discrete procedural problem.123 
 In this judicial-appointments episode, new rules merely replaced existing ones; 
new constraints did not stop, but rather shifted, battles over entrenchment. At each 
step the parties fought under the rule laid down most recently. While elaborating ever-
more precise rules of constraint restricted the leeway for such battles, the process also 
narrowed and focused the resulting conflict. This pattern can introduce clarity to a 
process and thereby facilitate exploitation of the process. In such cases, the 
momentum of partisan conflicts over democratic regulation does not halt, but rather 
increases. The benefit of elaborating new constraint rules is often temporary at best: 
there is a chaos period, or a lag phase, during which parties adapt to shifting and still-
uncertain rules. Impartiality might well thrive in this brief calm, but the drawbacks 
are considerable. Periods of lag and calm in the United States have declined as 
partisan efforts have been systematized and professionalized, escalating turnover rates 
for new rules that are then exploited and rendered obsolete.124 This rapid turnover and 
the narrowing of battlegrounds for procedural dominance engender a focus on 
 
120 See e.g. Rosenberg, supra note 106 at 300; Issacharoff, “Section 5”, supra note 99. 
121 Carl Hulse, “Compromise in the Senate: The Nominees; Many Republicans Are Already Eager 
to Challenge Agreement on Filibusters” The New York Times (25 May 2005) A18. 
122 Ibid. This cycle ended with the takeover of the Senate by Democrats in 2006.  
123 See Charles Babington & Susan Schmidt, “Filibuster Deal Puts Democrats In a Bind” 
Washington Post (4 July 2005) A1. 
124 See Pamela Karlan, “The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism” (1993) 71 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1705 at 1726-37 [Karlan, “Rights to Vote”]; Hasen, supra note 12 at 949.  
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process.125 These problems appear intractable: given a cycle of partisan rule making, 
legislators or judges seeking a way out most often turn to new rules of constraint. The 
hope is that a new rule will wrest decision making from the cycle.126 In a partisan 
system, new rules frequently falter just like their predecessors. Nevertheless, we see 
the approach followed determinedly cycle after cycle. 
 As noted above, impartial decision making is receptive to the full spectrum of 
relevant substantive concerns. Impartial decision makers therefore decide without 
fixating on the rules of process. They are aware of and follow, but do not focus on or 
attempt to manipulate, the rules of procedure that govern their work. On the 
impartiality ideal, decision makers are attentive to appropriate substantive criteria 
rather than strongly conscious of process or focused on the downstream effects of 
their decisions on particular parties.127 In the case of impartial boundary readjustment, 
decision makers would especially ignore the effects of their decisions on the 
performance of political parties in elections. However, regulating in favour of such 
ideal decision making presents a Catch-22: in aiming to reduce behaviour fixated on 
process, straightforward attempts to deploy new rules of process to constrain abuse—
including new regulatory branches or the traditional safeguards of administrative 
impartiality—can be self-defeating by drawing further attention to process.128 In order 
to prevent abuse of process, we must be subtler. A rule against process exploitation 
should appear natural, unconnected to any partisan camp, authored by no one in 
particular, and thus separate from or above normal politics.129 Such rules would 
command adherence without opening further avenues for rule exploitation. As I will 
 
125 Part of the problem is that substantive argument becomes process’s rhetorical proxy. As Karlan 
notes, groups battling for procedural dominance over decision-making systems invoke ostensibly 
impartial substantive reasons for rule changes. She predicts that “[j]ust as the political parties learned 
to use one person, one vote, the Voting Rights Act, and the Shaw principle [applying strict scrutiny to 
readjustment geared to increasing minority-representation] as ‘stalking horses’ for pursuing partisan 
ends, so too they will learn to use [the newer legal standards of] Growe and Lawyer” (“Fire”, supra 
note 39 at 762). 
126 In the Senate judicial-appointments case, with each of five procedural manoeuvres, the parties 
did not appear to predict counter-attacks, such as that the threat of filibuster could provoke the so-
called “nuclear option” of changing filibuster rules. 
127 See Lorraine Weinrib, “Appointing Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada in the Charter Era: A 
Study in Institutional Function and Design” in Appointing Judges: Philosophy, Politics and Practice: 
Papers (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1991) 109 at 132. 
128 See examples in Part IV.  
129 Roberto Mangabeira Unger has noted that even though such norms are of course human 
artefacts, they suggest origins in the “underlying natural order” (Social Theory: Its Situation and Its 
Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 1). In Lessig’s words, an informal norm does 
not appear “contingent or contested” but rather “feels natural” and is “accept[ed]” or “taken for 
granted” (supra note 26 at 958-59 [emphasis in original]). See also Harold Hongju Koh’s remarks in 
Stephen J. Toope et al., “Contemporary Conceptions of Customary International Law” (Panel 
discussion at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington D.C., 2 
April 1998), (1998) 92 Am. Soc. Int’l L. Rev. 37 at 38.  
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show further below, rules based on informal norms of political culture can have these 
features. 
C. Traditional Administrative-Law Models and Democratic Regulation 
 In Part IV, I will consider democratic-regulation models that can foster informal 
norms of impartial decision making. But to close out the present part, I will first show 
that traditional administrative-law approaches based on the constraint model 
predominate in works on reforming electoral-boundary readjustment. Three main 
contributions present practical proposals backed by sustained theoretical accounts. 
These include two from American authors who are concerned with the polarized and 
dysfunctional state of politics in that country. Richard Hasen and Christopher 
Elmendorf provide thoughtful and creative solutions in the form of administrative 
bodies that are meant to address the entrenchment problem in readjustment. Hasen 
proposes a set of commissions reined in by elaborately articulated standards for 
impartial conduct. Elmendorf advocates the creation of an “advisory commission” 
whose lack of binding authority mitigates the risk of entrenchment. The Canadian 
author Mark Carter addresses commission oversight much more as a critic. From a 
position firmly rooted in the constraint model, he suggests a shift toward more 
searching judicial involvement. In addition, I will give attention to the popular 
advocacy of an American organization, Common Cause, whose membership is 
largely drawn from the academic community. I will also reference certain Canadian 
reports, studies, and comments, each of which, to some degree, promotes reform.130 
These various sources illustrate the intellectual dominance of constraint 
assumptions—though tentative gestures toward alternatives are made in Hasen and 
Elmendorf’s works. 
 In proposals for changes to administrative-readjustment procedures, we see the 
following familiar administrative-law safeguards: 
 (1) Transparency. Mark Carter criticizes the “room in which to hide” that remains 
for gerrymandering after the Carter decision’s loose standards of review of 
commission decision making.131 Additionally, a House of Commons committee report 
by former Speaker Peter Milliken advocates opening up the selection process for 
FEBC commissioners. Potential commissioners should, Milliken argues, nominate 
themselves for membership by applying to the Speaker of the House of Commons.132 
And in another recommendation designed to keep influential partisans from 
exercising power behind closed doors, Common Cause proposes the creation of new 
state readjustment commissions whose members would “be prohibited from all ex-
 
130 In addition to the sources cited in this section, several sources call in passing for commission 
solutions to readjustment problems. See Rosen, “Divided”, supra note 112; Klarman, supra note 17 at 
529 (offering, briefly, one of the earliest proposals for an independent readjustment commission); 
Issacharoff, “Gerrymandering”, supra note 9 at 644. 
131 Carter, supra note 98 at 58. 
132 Milliken Report, supra note 98, vol. 3 at 33:17. 
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parte communications” with elected officials and lobbyists.133 Commission hearings 
would also be publicized, and all records of debates and of information that is relied 
on would be widely distributed.134  
 (2) Public Participation. Opportunities for public participation are key to 
Elmendorf’s approach.135 They are similarly central to the Common Cause 
Guidelines, which call for public comments and questions. These recommendations 
view public participation as a means of scrutinizing and constraining discretion to 
avoid its abuse.136  
 (3) Representativeness. Some approaches see impartiality safeguards split the 
composition of an agency between or among political parties, either in equal numbers 
or in proportion to their legislative representation. Representativeness of this kind is a 
common approach to political balance in the United States.137 Some Canadian 
commissions charged with drawing ridings for the provincial legislatures employ 
party-representation techniques.138 These bodies have sometimes run less smoothly 
than their federal counterpart; for example, members of one rancorous “bipartisan” 
commission in Alberta in the 1990s were unable to reach agreement over final 
boundaries.139 Elmendorf suggests the creation of a readjustment commission for the 
United States that comprises an “ideologically representative cross section of the 
citizenry.”140 He is also sympathetic to an approach mandating bipartisan 
membership.141 Similarly, Common Cause cites bipartisanship as a possibility.142 In 
these assorted recommendations, we see the often self-fulfilling assumption, 
described in the previous section, that individual decision makers will render partisan 
decisions, and that the process will feature procedural manoeuvring.143  
 
133 Common Cause, California Common Cause Redistricting Guidelines (August 2005), s. 3 
[Common Cause, Guidelines], online: Common Cause <http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c= 
dkLNK1MQIwG&b=366007>. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Supra note 12 at 1376.  
136 Supra note 133, s. 3. An alternative rationale for public participation can be enhancing the 
democratic legitimacy of the process. 
137 State electoral commissions generally split representation evenly between the two parties or offer 
a numeric advantage to the state’s majority party (Hasen, supra note 12 at 974-76). In another 
example, the six commissioners of the Federal Elections Commission (in charge of implementing 
federal election rules, including campaign-finance legislation) include three Republicans and three 
Democrats. See e.g. Gerard Clark & Steven Lichtman, “The Finger in the Dike: Campaign Finance 
Regulation After McConnell” (2006) 39 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 629 at 656. 
138 Alberta, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island have employed party-
representation methods. See Courtney, supra note 12 at 107-10, 293.  
139 See ibid. at 111-12. 
140 Supra note 12 at 1407. 
141 Ibid. at 1408-10. 
142 See e.g. supra note 133, s. 1. See also John Fund, Stealing Elections: How Voter Fraud 
Threatens Our Democracy (San Francisco: Encounter, 2004) at 147.  
143 See Hasen, supra note 12 at 989. 
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 The Common Cause Guidelines also recommend more complex forms of 
representativeness, reflecting the “geographic, racial, ethnic, gender, and age 
diversity” of a jurisdiction.144 We may read this benignly as a means of including 
otherwise marginalized perspectives, or alternatively as an expression of the 
constraint model, with representatives of various social factions meant to hold each 
other in mutual check and to battle out compromises.145  
 (4) Independence. Most proposals, including those of Hasen,146 Elmendorf147 and 
Common Cause,148 assume the necessity of commission independence. This position 
should be uncontroversial at a basic level. But in the context of regulating political 
power, independence safeguards face particularly acute troubles. American examples, 
such as most of the existing state readjustment commissions, demonstrate that 
partisans can almost always degrade independence by bypassing constraint 
safeguards.149 The traditional legalistic formulae for administrative independence are 
less important to impartial outcomes than is a culture of trust and trustworthiness. 
Indeed, the separation of certain governmental powers is not a feature of some 
systems that have generally been successful in avoiding entrenchment. The 
Westminster model, which fuses the executive and legislature, is an example of 
this.150  
 (5) Reconsideration and Review. Mark Carter’s proposals contemplate pervasive 
judicial involvement in the administrative readjustment process.151 In addition, the 
Common Cause Guidelines allow for “judicial review of plans” and reconsideration 
by the commissions.152 We have already seen that judicial involvement extends 
 
144 Supra note 133, s. 1. 
145 The latter suggests the weaker of the two conceptions of impartiality introduced above. 
146 Supra note 12 at 984. 
147 Supra note 12 at 1380, 1405-06, 1408, 1412-14. 
148 Supra note 133, s. 1. 
149 There are two general cases exemplifying this point. First, to bring greater independence to a 
process, we can create new bodies to carry out contentious tasks, such as electoral-boundary drawing. 
The problem then becomes how to appoint to the body independent-minded members rather than 
partisans. (This is a problem of the regress of partisanship from one point to another.) Second, a 
solution to the first problem is often thought to be bipartisan selections to the independent body. 
However, this solution generally produces bipartisan—rather than non-partisan—bodies, which as 
noted are often dysfunctional. To be sure, some multipartisan selection processes work well, such as 
Canada’s method of all-party parliamentary selection of the Chief Electoral Officer (see Massicotte, 
supra note 50 at 97-98). But the deciding factor here seems to be that the selection process is already 
characterized by broad trust and trustworthiness. This, then, brings us back to the problem with which 
we started—that the strongest safeguard against partisanship is a well-developed set of norms of trust 
and trustworthiness. 
150 See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at para. 7.3(a). The 
Cabinet holding sway over Parliament can manipulate political rules and seek selective party benefit; 
while this has happened often in Canada, it has not produced long-term single-party entrenchment. 
See supra note 10. 
151 Supra note 98. 
152 Supra note 133, s. 5. 
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throughout readjustment in the United States. In Canada, some recent cases suggest 
an increasing judicial willingness to intervene. Recently in Raîche v. Canada 
(A.G.),153 the Federal Court of Canada subjected the work of the FEBC for New 
Brunswick to judicial review. The court applied a standard of simple reasonableness, 
having considered adopting the lower patent-reasonableness threshold.154 At the same 
time, the case affirmed a substantively flexible approach; the FEBC’s error, in the 
court’s view, was in limiting itself to electoral-district population variations of no 
more than plus or minus 10 per cent—in contrast with the more generous plus-or-
minus 25 per cent range in the governing legislation.155 Other courts have affirmed the 
longstanding flexible framework of Carter. But as in Raîche their support is 
sometimes grudging or mixed; courts appear ready to step in more often to review 
readjustment, especially should the Supreme Court of Canada revisit Carter.156 
 (6) Rational Organization, Simplification, and Clarity. Under this final heading, 
the key assumptions of each author become clearest. Does a plan place hope in the 
creation of a new administrative branch per se to solve the entrenchment risk, without 
sufficient regard to specifics? Does the plan treat impartiality as a value that is 
directly manipulable under a regime of ever more elaborate formal rules? Each of the 
surveyed proposals, being premised on a wariness of power and anticipating an 
attitude of mutual distrust among decision makers, ultimately calls for a constraint 
approach. Among these proposals there is general agreement that lines of exercise of 
power should be (a) simple, clear, and rationally organized, (b) centralized, 
coordinated and coherent, and (c) subject to cost-benefit analyses and top-down 
control.  
 That constraint appears in the various U.S. proposals might not be surprising, 
given the persistence of this model in the American intellectual tradition.157 But Mark 
Carter’s constraint proposals for Canada are the most extreme. In addition, John 
Courtney, the leading observer of Canadian readjustment, laments, more mildly to be 
sure, that Parliament and the courts can only do so much to offer “clarification” in 
“statutes and guidelines”.158 The Milliken Report and the report of an inquiry headed 
by Pierre Lortie both outline reforms to tighten controls on the boundary-drawing 
 
153 2004 FC 679, [2005] 1 F.C.R. 93, 120 C.R.R. (2d) 133 [Raîche]. 
154 Ibid. at paras. 54-65. 
155 Ibid. at paras. 67-72, 82; EBRA, supra note 13, s. 15(2)(b). 
156 Cases following the flexible standard include City of Charlottetown v. Prince Edward Island 
(1998), [1999] 168 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 80, 168 D.L.R. (4th) 79 (P.E.I.S.C. (A.D.)); East York (Borough 
of) v. Ontario (1997), [1998] 36 O.R. (3d) 733, 45 C.R.R. (2d) 237 (C.A.); Friends of Democracy v. 
Northwest Territories, [1999] N.W.T.J. No. 28 (N.W.T.S.C. (A.D.)); Reference Re Electoral 
Boundaries Commission Act (Alberta) (1991), 120 A.R. 70, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 447 (C.A.) [Boundaries 
Comission cited to A.R.]. In Boundaries Commission in particular, the court appeared reluctant to 
apply the precedent (ibid. at 454). 
157 See supra note 100. 
158 Courtney, supra note 12 at 259. Courtney generally believes that the Canadian commissions 
merit trust in handling the “elusive and imprecise” standards that remain (ibid.). 
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process in Canada. Reforms would include narrower population-variance allowances 
and, most notably, more explicit definitions of standards such as “communities of 
interest”.159 And in a recent study, Michael Pal and Sujit Choudhry echo these 
sentiments, criticizing the “lack of discipline imposed by the Charter [case law] on 
the drawing of electoral boundaries.”160 The various works thus present a modest 
inversion. American authors are increasingly seeking alternative solutions. These 
authors look with frustration at the escalating dysfunction of their own national 
system, a development that presents cautionary lessons as the constraint model 
captures more Canadian imaginations. Hasen and Elmendorf’s solutions take 
tentative steps past rationalization and constraint. Their plans deserve serious 
consideration. But despite their intentions, neither author effects a complete break, 
and their remaining reliance on constraint gives reason to doubt the likely efficacy of 
their plans. 
 Within each proposal, then, a project of constraint predominates. As noted, Mark 
Carter believes there is a “need for a Charter jurisprudence” to elaborate rules for 
readjustment and “more clearly restrict[]” its management.161 The notion of a “more 
consistent vision” that “promises to structure and place limits upon the scope of 
interpretive discretion” is an example of rationalization and rule making elaborated to 
curtail ambiguity.162 Common Cause similarly employs the language of “clear 
process.”163 But Hasen’s work provides the most prominent example, proposing rules 
tweaked toward perfection as a means of limiting discretion.164 He recommends 
“[r]emoving the opportunity for partisan election officials to make discretionary 
decisions,”165 in part by implementing “periodic election law audits,” thereby 
 
159 Milliken Report, supra note 98, vol. 3 at 33:25; Lortie Report, supra note 98 at 150, 157-58. 
160 Michael Pal & Sujit Choudhry, “Is Every Ballot Equal? Visible-Minority Vote Dilution in 
Canada” (2007) 13:1 Choices 1 at 14-16. The authors phrase this as a general fault in the Charter case 
law. But their primary concern is minority-vote dilution: the electoral votes of visible and other 
minorities concentrate within urban ridings, each of which encompasses more voters than does the 
average rural riding. I am sympathetic to their more particular critique. Carter justified rural–urban 
constituency size disparities primarily in light of MPs’ difficulties in serving physically vast rural 
ridings. However, I wonder whether, in the fifteen years since Carter, developments such as 
unprecedented advances in information technology now weaken this justification. Smaller urban–rural 
disparities therefore make sense generally. However, it remains important that FEBCs have the 
flexibility to draw boundaries in light of the many substantive considerations—such as the cohesive 
communities of Raîche (supra note 140)—that keep the commissions busy for up to two years of 
deliberations. Some of these considerations would necessarily become difficult to implement given 
narrower population variances. 
161 Carter, supra note 98 at 59-60. 
162 Ibid. at 71. Note that Carter addresses and ultimately rejects critiques of rights-based judicial 
oversight of readjustment. But he narrowly addresses and shoots down only the critical-legal-theory 
view that the “legal system operates so as to maintain unequal and oppressive social relations” (ibid. at 
62). 
163 Supra note 133, s. 5. 
164 Hasen, supra note 12 at 944. 
165 Ibid. at 983. 
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progressively eliminating “potential ambiguities” from the law.166 To Hasen, 
ambiguities are failures of vigilance, presenting decision makers with irresistible 
opportunities for partisanship and entrenchment. A reliance on the perfectability of 
formal law to control conduct animates his approach. 
 But Hasen himself acknowledges that his proposed set of legal constraints upon 
discretion would occasionally let partisan abuses slip past. He therefore offers a 
second, institutional solution: a readjustment commission for each state. Citing the 
track records of Canada and Australia, Hasen proposes to import their commission 
solutions.167 It is, from the outset, an instance of faith in the self-evident wisdom or 
“common-sense”168 of creating new institutions per se. However, to his credit, 
Hasen’s solution of a new administrative apparatus goes somewhat beyond the bare 
adoption of a new branch and into the specifics of design. Hasen even touches on the 
question of how trust develops in decision-making institutions. Here he offers his 
most compelling ideas—meant explicitly to “restore some public trust in the process 
of election administration.”169  
 A first idea, and the weaker of two, looks much like his earlier formal-constraint 
proposal. He reasons that “the fundamental principles of neutral election 
administration are not subject to serious debate”;170 by laying these out in law, it is 
possible to develop trust and trustworthiness within a new commission. But there are 
problems with this approach. Hasen proposes that trust be legislated by laying out in 
law the features of an ideal impartial decision maker. However, the familiar Catch-22 
applies: because part of the challenge of impartiality is getting decision makers to 
fixate less on process, elaborating new process rules that call directly on decision 
makers to act impartially often falters, as we saw in the previous section.  
 Hasen seems aware of the difficulty of legislating impartiality. He therefore 
writes that laws should set out the features of trustworthy decision makers and not 
decision making: “[N]eutral election administration is easier to achieve than neutral 
redistricting principles.”171 But can we separate the decision maker’s impartiality from 
concrete meanings or manifestations of impartiality? How does a decision maker 
acting “as free from fraud as possible”172 approach a given boundary-drawing 
problem? These are not quibbles over the meanings of words that are indeterminate at 
their margins, but rather problems of basic terminological emptiness. Some parts of 
Hasen’s proposed checklist for impartial administrators are reasonable and workable. 
 
166 Ibid. One method is to “articulate a consensus set of election administration principles that 
nonpartisan administrators could apply” (ibid.). Note that with the language of limiting ambiguity 
here, Hasen advocates an approach almost explicitly opposite to the ambiguation methods proposed 
below. 
167 Ibid. at 945, 983-90. 
168 Ibid. at 974. 
169 Ibid. at 983. 
170 Ibid. at 988. 
171 Ibid.  
172 Ibid. 
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For instance, he provides that a commissioner should not “co-chair a presidential 
committee.”173 But most parts are problematic: what does it mean to say that 
administrators should not “do anything to favor one candidate, party, or issue”?174 
These are features not of impartial administrators, but impartial administration, and 
the routine slide from the former to the latter seems inevitable. Almost anything a 
decision maker does—drawing a black-majority township into or out of an electoral 
district, for example—favours one candidate, party, or issue. While Hasen therefore 
means to avoid defining impartial decision making in elaborate detail, being aware of 
the pitfalls of such efforts, his focus on impartial decision makers is not likely to be 
more effective. 
 A second trust-generating design feature is more elegant and more plausible, 
though still primarily intelligible as a form of constraint. Hasen proposes to select 
commissioners through 75 per cent super-majority votes in the state legislatures, thus 
effectively requiring support from both political parties.175 The plan is a constraint 
proposal in that it assumes distrust between the parties and systematizes and 
reinforces the same. However, the proposal is also intended as trust-generating, 
conceivably installing non-partisan decision makers to begin rehabilitating the 
American readjustment system. Nevertheless, this part of Hasen’s plan also appears 
flawed. Legislators must divine in advance which selectees will act “above 
politics”176—selecting perhaps for inoffensive but middling administrators. Other 
authors propose institutions that promote good decision making irrespective of the 
particular identities of the decision makers. On these approaches, the success of the 
system depends less on getting the selection process right at the outset. But the 
foremost problem with Hasen’s plan remains the formidable constraint presented by 
the super-majority requirement. The use of constraint mechanisms to build trust is a 
creative, if fraught, approach. Would kicking off a process with a method of member 
selection premised heavily on mutual party animus undercut the main subsequent aim 
of inculcating trust? Super-majority requirements potentially recast each individual 
legislator as a powerful swing voter—a formula for intensified politicization and 
gridlock.177 
 Christopher Elmendorf’s alternative administrative solution to the problem of 
readjustment is an Advisory Commission (AC) that would draw new district maps 
and urge legislators to adopt them.178 Elmendorf cites two key rationales for creating a 
body whose decisions are advisory rather than formally binding. First, the AC would 
need to work for its trust. Because advisory decisions can be ignored, the plan sets up 
 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. at 984. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Individual dissenters can wield inordinate power to dictate terms by threatening to withhold 
votes. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, “Supermajority Rules and the Judicial 
Confirmation Process” (2005) 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 543 at 550. 
178 Elmendorf, supra note 12 at 1371, 1380. 
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a “competition for authority” between the AC and legislators.179 Like Hasen, 
Elmendorf explicitly means for this dynamic to engender trust. The AC would be 
“authorized to place its concerns on the legislature’s agenda or a referendum ballot, 
and positioned to compete with legislators for the voters’ trust.”180 Elmendorf’s plan 
aims to build trust and trustworthiness as the competing authorities demonstrate that 
they are trustworthy: that they habitually issue impartial decisions apparently driven 
by appropriate substantive criteria for readjustment.181 A second reason for the AC’s 
advisory function is that if partisans nevertheless do assume control of the 
commission, the body’s non-binding decisions may safely be ignored.182 
 The plan has a mark in its favour given its goal of pushing democratic regulation 
beyond constraint and toward trust solutions. However, apart from its advisory role, 
the AC’s structure is undistinguished and would likely still engender partisanship 
problems. The AC does little else to improve on the constraint model, placing too 
much faith in the solution of adopting a new decision-making body per se. We see 
some of this misplaced faith in Elmendorf’s proposal of bluntly combining trust and 
constraint approaches. He imagines trust developing in a milieu where constraint now 
strongly dominates. As we saw, the momentum of constraint can be difficult to halt. 
This momentum formalizes democratic regulation: constraints—formal, direct, 
explicit, and premised on distrust—breed more of the same. In American democratic 
regulation, we have thus seen processes increasingly centred around formal rules. 
These are rules whose authority is relatively clear: explicit agreements between 
political parties, enforceable legislation, regulation, and court judgments.183 In such a 
formalizing process weaker informal norms of institutional culture are lost, along 
with their richness, subtlety, intermediacy, flexibility, and comparative efficacy. 
Effectively regulating informal norms of trust would mean adopting procedures in 
which trust is stable because it is not susceptible to the push and haul of politics and 
the constraint model. Decision making premised on trust and trustworthiness should 
remain largely separate from any constraint rules. How regulation can be designed in 
this way will be a major concern of Parts III and IV. 
 Looked at more concretely, there are two specific problems with Elmendorf’s 
AC. First, the AC is meant to enjoy trust and exert sway as a matter of subtle degree. 
The AC would be expected to bind in proportion to its demonstrated impartiality. But 
such a fine balance appears unlikely within a context of robust constraint. This 
 
179 Ibid. at 1382. 
180 Ibid. at 1371. 
181 Ibid. at 1382-83. 
182 Ibid. at at 1436. 
183 A recent example was the United States Attorney General’s firing of eight leading federal 
prosecutors, apparently for their weak loyalty to the President and the Republican party. Responding 
to the scandal, the President stated that U.S. attorneys serve at his pleasure. See Michael Abramowitz, 
“Bush Asserts Increased Confidence in Gonzales” Washington Post (24 April 2007) A3. While 
perhaps true as a matter of formal law, the observation dramatically devalues the unwritten principle 
of prosecutorial impartiality. 
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particular hybrid of trust and distrust is likely to be unstable as trust norms yield to 
encroaching formal rules. A second concrete problem follows from a distinction 
between decisions meant for selective adoption and full adoption. Consider first a 
kind of commission that issues numerous recommendations from which legislators 
may pick and choose. Some such recommendations are impliedly optional, or are 
aspirational and await a time when governments can afford to adopt them. For 
example, the American 9/11 Commission proposed more changes to national-security 
procedures than can realistically be implemented.184 Generally, advice subject to 
second-guessing defeats the purpose of trust in advice, except in the limited sense that 
the advice provides helpful information to guide other decision makers.185 At the other 
extreme is a strong notion of trust: we may trust the whole decision and adopt all its 
parts. Given the potential for entrenchment in the democratic-regulation context, it is 
generally preferable for the whole of a decision to be binding.186 It may often be 
reasonable for legislators to second-guess other kinds of administrative decisions, but 
selective trust poses special risks for democratic regulation. A process that subjects 
trust in democratic regulation to competition encourages legislators to challenge the 
very trust in commissions that can keep legislators from entrenching their own power.  
 Elmendorf predicts success for his plan by relying on foreign examples for 
empirical backing, noting that trust in democratic regulation has survived and 
flourished outside the United States.187 However, in most of these cases regulators did 
not have to develop trust in an environment of robust formal constraint. Even if 
applied to contexts such as Canadian readjustment, where constraint has yet to 
become the regulatory tool of choice, Elmendorf’s innovation would probably present 
an unstable marriage of trust and distrust. The plan presents a contradiction of 
concepts: trust is meant to emerge within an institution designed to “enhance ... 
political contestation,”188 with powers counterpoised to prompt constraint, a struggle 
for dominance, and a hawkish mutual distrust between decision makers.189 
 
184 U.S., The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), cc. 12-13. 
185 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 28-31 
[Raz, Morality] (utterances may “provide information about the balance of reasons as they exist [in 
favour of a particular action] separately and independently of such utterances” at 29). 
186 A wholly binding AC would effectively not be advisory and would lack the asserted benefits of 
the latter. 
187 Elmendorf, supra note 12 at 1372, 1386-90 (referencing Australia, Canada, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom). 
188 Ibid. at 1371. 
189 See e.g. ibid. at 1383-84. Analysts generally characterize decision making based on trust as 
rational and cooperative, not combative. See e.g. Denise Scheberle, Federalism and Environmental 
Policy: Trust and the Politics of Implementation, 2d ed. (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004); Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002) at 167. 
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D. Departing from the Constraint Model 
 We have already seen two alternatives to constraint. One simple alternative is a 
laissez-faire approach granting wide decision-making latitude to democratic 
regulators. Issacharoff’s opposition to renewing parts of the VRA is an example. As 
already noted, he views constraints as straightjackets: remove them, and perhaps a 
mature Southern politics that is more impartial and less reliant on administrative and 
judicial intervention will develop. Equivalently in Canada, keep the straightjackets 
off, and let existing norms of impartiality in democratic regulation continue to work 
unhindered. In contrast with the laissez-faire model, a second alternative sees 
institutions actively designed to engender norms of trust and trustworthiness. As we 
saw above, both Hasen and Elmendorf nod toward this approach. 
 Attempting deliberately to generate, through law, norms mediated outside of 
law—to regulate informal cultural norms of trust and trustworthiness—is among the 
thorniest challenges of institutional design. Few forms of regulation are more certain 
to produce unintended consequences than those functioning at the interface between 
law and culture.190 And most such active regulation must usually begin with formal 
rule making, the primary tool available to governments. However, looking back at a 
number of cases in which governments regulated cultural practices, Lawrence Lessig 
finds a number of successful challenges to existing norms—for example, norms 
against interracial mixing and norms favouring duelling or gender discrimination.191 
Indeed, I will outline further examples in Parts III and IV, including examples from 
the readjustment context. Ambiguity in Canada’s FEBC readjustment procedures 
helps to account for their early and sustained successes in developing impartial 
decision making.192 Governments can in some cases change or create informal 
institutional norms, even if such results are seldom guaranteed.  
 
190 Lessig himself notes that “[g]overnments, as other institutions, are inept; changes are very often 
not as intended” (supra note 26 at 957). See also Richard H. Pildes, “The Unintended Cultural 
Consequences of Public Policy” (1991) 89 Mich. L. Rev. 936 at 938-40; Issacharoff & Karlan, supra 
note 102; Rosenberg, supra note 107; Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing 
Courts Are Wrong for America (New York: Basic, 2005) at 100-01. 
191 Lessig, supra note 26 at 964-72, 989-91. 
192 Like any history, the fullest account is one of multiple concurring influences, worth bearing in 
mind even as we isolate and focus on apparent primary causes. There may be several parallel 
explanations, all of which inevitably interrelate. Courtney cites a set of three causes: first, a 1950s–60s 
shift toward a politics regarding the interests of the country as a whole; second, numerous unstable 
minority Parliaments over this same period; and third, a mood for change developed in Quiet 
Revolution-era Quebec, site of one of Canada’s first readjustment commissions (supra note 12 at 44-
52, 55). To Courtney’s history we might add, fourth, the broadly-acknowledged differences in 
structure as between parliamentary and presidential democracies; but these, though relevant, may not 
explain why Canada diverged in the 1960s. Fifth, Canada’s multi-party system might encourage 
polarization less than does the American two-party system; but this difference, too, held before the 
1960s. Sixth, French marginalization inside Quebec subsided in the 1960s, forcing a national politics 
of engagement and accommodation. Finally, the United States experienced a more dramatic series of 
political scandals in recent decades. See generally David Farrell, Comparing Electoral Systems 
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 In any case, regulating to promote trust and trustworthiness is an approach worth 
trying, or that we must try in light of the limitations of regulation by constraint. As I 
have argued, informal norms of trust and trustworthiness control partisanship at least 
as well as formal constraints do. Indeed, it is often the case that only the latter are able 
to diminish partisanship. But active regulation is also preferable to laissez-faire 
approaches. In a United States South that is now heavily politically polarized, it is 
doubtful that leaving readjustment in the hands of legislators would bring 
impartiality. As we saw, boundary readjustment through normal legislation can 
seldom be seen as impartial.193 Readjustment must be carried out by third-party 
commissions. But the status quo for federal readjustment in Canada may also be 
inadequate. At the outset of this article, I listed the stresses facing the existing system, 
including declining trust and a rising culture of scrutiny of government. These 
coincide with frequent studies and committee reports advocating reforms to 
readjustment according to the constraint model.194 
 In the next two parts, I will focus on understanding the institutional features of 
the Canadian readjustment process that have helped to generate its trustworthiness 
and impartiality—features that therefore merit preservation or even extension. I will 
rely in part on interviews with individual FEBC commissioners, who spoke to me 
about the strengths and faults of their commissions. I will also draw on the 
interdisciplinary literature describing specific institutional forms that have previously 
seen the emergence of trust and trustworthiness in democratic regulation. Actively 
designing institutions to build trust and trustworthiness is at once one of the most 
promising models of democratic regulation and the least explored in legal 
scholarship.  
III. Regulating Norms of Impartiality in Democratic Regulation 
 Authors have often sought to explain the conditions under which legal change 
can bring about desired social change.195 Lawrence Lessig offers ideas that are among 
the most detailed, insightful, and distinctively relevant to impartial democratic 
regulation. Further on, I will bring in other authors and other ideas not contemplated 
by Lessig. However, Lessig’s work is a helpful stepping-off point. His approach 
                                                                                                                                       
(London: Prentice Hall, 1997); Paul R. Abramson, Political Attitudes in America: Formation and 
Change (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1983). 
193 Supra notes 1-10, 14 and accompanying texts. This has been true of readjustment by legislatures 
in both the United States and Canada. 
194 Supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
195 Some authors bring to bear the tools of economic analysis. See e.g. Rosenberg, supra note 107. 
Other authors isolate the democratic legitimacy of institutions as essential for successful social 
regulation. See e.g. William N. Eskridge Jr., “Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support 
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics” (2005) 114 Yale L.J. 1279 at 1285-87, 1312-13; Pettit, 
supra note 91 at 296-99; Rosen, Democratic Branch, supra note 69 at 14; Mullan, supra note 20, c. 
8(A); Tom R. Tyler, “What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness of 
Legal Procedures” (1988) 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 103 at 129. 
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touches briefly on a general and promising set of solutions to problems of democratic 
regulation. This part introduces ambiguity as a tool of democratic regulation by 
beginning with Lessig’s ideas on the subject and then considering several additional 
rationales for ambiguous legal and institutional design. In Part IV, I will detail the 
limitations and potential scope of ambiguity methods.  
A. Lessig and Ambiguity 
 Lessig describes four methods by which governments deliberately reshape social 
norms. Two of these methods, which he labels “behavioral techniques”, change the 
meanings associated with particular actions “indirectly by inducing certain behavior 
that, over time, will affect these meanings.”196 One behavioural technique is “ritual”. 
Ritual sees a behaviour mandated by law fortify a particular social norm. For 
example, American schoolchildren daily salute the flag; this state-mandated policy, 
which the Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed as constitutionally 
permissible, aims to inculcate patriotism.197 Another behavioural technique is that of 
“inhibition”, which is ritual’s opposite. Following this approach, laws repress a 
particular behaviour. Lessig gives the example of segregation, which “is both an 
instance of racial harm and a behavior that reinforces the social meaning of 
inequality.”198 As he notes, “Prohibiting segregation is a way of undermining practices 
that reinforce social meanings of stigma and inequality.”199 
 Two more methods are “semiotic”. These “change[] meaning[s] directly, by 
interfering with existing meanings.”200 The first such method is that of “tying”. Tying 
is an “attempt[] to transform the social meaning of one act by tying it to, or 
associating it with, another social meaning.”201 Sanctioning an act by criminalizing it 
or advertising its ills, in either case with the intention of stigmatizing and deterring 
the conduct, is one form of “tying” open to legislators. Examples include attempts to 
control duelling in the old American South (discussed below) and cigarette smoking 
more recently. Both demonstrate the complexity of social regulation since neither was 
entirely successful. 
 Last on Lessig’s list is the semiotic technique of ambiguity. Lessig is probably 
right to view this one as “the most interesting.”202 Here the social-norm 
architect tries to give the particular act, the meaning of which is to be regulated, 
a second meaning as well, one that acts to undermine the negative effects of the 
first. In this sense, while tying is about establishing that X is like Y, 
 
196 Lessig, supra note 26 at 1008. Lessig cites “social meanings” throughout, but for present 
purposes differences between this term and “social norms” are not significant. 
197 Ibid. at 1014.  
198 Ibid. at 1013. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. at 1008.  
201 Ibid. at 1009. 
202 Ibid. at 1010, 1015.  
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ambiguation is about establishing that X is like Y or Z. It simply adds a link 
without denying an existing link, and thereby blurs just what it is that X is.203 
Returning to the case of duelling, Lessig writes that straightforward prohibitions 
failed more often than the alternative of ambiguous regulation.204 He notes that “what 
held dueling together was solidarity among an elite class” of Southern gentlemen. 205 
“Simply banning dueling,” he claims, “would not necessarily challenge that 
solidarity.”206 A man who declined a duel on grounds of its illegality and who was 
consequently viewed as a coward risked his place at the heights of the social ladder. 
Lessig draws on histories illustrating another, somewhat more effective regulatory 
option: barring duellers from public office. Since holding such office was “a duty of 
the elite,” the message of duelling thereby came to include not only the dishonour of 
declining a challenge but also the dishonour that would result from accepting it.207 
Lessig explains: 
The state’s action here served to ambiguate a gentleman’s duty, and thereby 
facilitated the transformation of the social meaning of dueling itself. Against the 
background that the state has reconstructed, to choose to duel would be to 
choose to serve private interests over collective duty.208 
 Lessig’s categories are fascinating in themselves, though his examples illustrate 
only part of what makes ambiguity as interesting as he suggests. In exploring how 
Lessig’s basic outline of norm-regulation techniques can relate to political decision 
making, I wish to diverge from his work and to build further. What is disappointing in 
Lessig’s recognition of the broader implications of ambiguity is the narrow range of 
cases in which he imagines this technique applying. The example of duelling is not 
one that demonstrates the benefits of ambiguous social meanings—of meanings that 
are multiplied and rendered inconsistent. It is simply a case of meaning Y (dishonour) 
negating and replacing meaning X (honour). The aim of the regulation barring access 
to public office for duellers was to turn a social meaning of honour into one of 
dishonour. What then does ambiguous regulation do that simpler techniques negating 
or creating meaning, such as tying, cannot? Good examples of the full use of 
ambiguity would see ambiguity itself, rather than ambiguity as a by-product or 
transition stage of negation, put to work as a tool of legal regulation. Such uses do 
exist and display some of the real promise of “obscuring what was clear” that Lessig 
inchoately identifies. 209 The tool can be a powerful one, not least in the context of 
democratic regulation.  
 
203 Ibid. at 1010. 
204 Ibid. at 970. 
205 Ibid. at 971. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. at 972. 
209 Ibid. at 1015. 
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 In the remainder of this part, I first outline the ways in which the FEBC system is 
an ambiguous one. I then examine four rationales for designing ambiguities into law 
and institutions. All are ways in which ambiguity can help to build trust, 
trustworthiness, and impartiality. Throughout, I offer examples from an assortment of 
past projects of institutional design. But the major examples will be the Canadian 
FEBCs. Extensive ambiguity appears to have helped develop the strong culture of 
impartial decision making of the FEBC system.  
B. Forms of Ambiguity 
 Ambiguity in law and institutional design can be a result of numerous and diverse 
(1) procedures, (2) substantive criteria, and (3) decision-maker roles. The 
extraordinarily complex FEBC system illustrates each of these types.210 
1. Procedural Ambiguity 
 From the description of FEBC readjustment above, we see that decision making 
runs an obstacle course of diverse and redundant stages. There is a mixture of 
advisory and direct influences: parliamentarians and members of the public make 
recommendations, and commissioners finally decide. There is a combination of 
partisan and generally impartial contributions. There are open and in camera sessions. 
The stages of the Canadian process are numerous and their total duration extensive. 
Together, they typically exceed the minimum consultation periods defined by statute 
and typically last two years or more.211  
2. Substantive Ambiguity 
 The FEBC system features a diversity of broad and sometimes incommensurable 
substantive criteria for commissioners to consider.212 The principles set out in Carter 
and in legislation are pitched at different levels of specificity and breadth, as well as 
clarity and vagueness. The practical problems of representing a large rural riding are 
concerns, but so are “human dignity” and “social justice”. Many principles overlap or 
conflict with others even in the abstract: geography, community history, community 
interests, practical problems of representation, numeric parity among ridings, and 
effective representation.213 Others overlap in their application, as where multiple 
 
210 Courts have made note of “the complexity of the electoral-boundary readjustment process” 
(Raîche, supra note 153 at para. 32). See also Carter, supra note 51. 
211 Elections Canada, Representation in the House of Commons of Canada (Ottawa: Elections 
Canada, 2002) at 14. 
212 Raîche, supra note 153 at para. 32 (“[t]he commissions are required to balance conflicting 
policies”). 
213 The most common conflict of principles is that between numeric parity of ridings (the one 
person, one vote default) and the principle that large rural ridings should have populations well below 
the average, given the difficulty of representing vast under-populated areas. 
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communities with distinct histories occupy the same region. The rules for numeric 
apportionment of voters among ridings alone are elaborately complex.214 In contrast, 
“[n]o equivalent rabbit-warren of representational protection exists in the United 
States.”215 There is in general a marked indeterminacy in the correct application of 
readjustment criteria.216 The substantive guidelines of the process can be applied in 
many alternative ways,217 and have an “elusive and imprecise quality about them.”218  
3. Role Ambiguity 
 Commissioners are drawn from a diversity of professional cultures with 
surprisingly little in common. The most recent round of readjustment saw judges and 
political scientists, who still predominate, sitting with members who included a social 
worker and an RCMP officer.219 Furthermore, the extensive opportunities for public 
participation noted above add a key additional dimension of role ambiguity; as I will 
note below, public submissions before the FEBCs are often highly persuasive. 
C. The Uses of Ambiguous Decision-Making Systems 
 There are several reasons why institutional architects might adopt ambiguous 
design features such as the above. In what follows, I outline four reasons that are 
particularly relevant to impartial democratic regulation.220 Although the reasons 
overlap at several points, each brings some precision to the insight that “ambiguity 
help[s] promote a fairer system.”221 
1. Preventing Fixation on Process 
 We previously saw that a problem for impartial regulation is keeping decision 
makers from focusing on process, and that constraint solutions often aggravate this 
 
214 Courtney, supra note 12 at 29-31. 
215 Ibid. at 29. 
216 An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29. 
217 Elections Canada observes that applying these substantive criteria is an “enormous task”, which 
requires “a delicate balancing act that must take into account human interests as well as geographic 
characteristics” (supra note 210 at 13). See also Raîche, supra note 153 at para. 32 (balancing 
readjustment criteria is “not an exact science”). 
218 Courtney, supra note 12 at 259. 
219 See Federal Elections Boundaries Commission, online: Elections Canada <www.elections.ca/ 
scripts/fedrep/elect_com.htm>.  
220 Among other notable contributions is Cass Sunstein’s theory of “incompletely theorized 
agreements”. Sunstein notes that some judicial decisions avoid aggravating political tensions by 
issuing one-off judgments while keeping underlying reasons ambiguous (Cass R. Sunstein, Legal 
Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 37-38, 102-06, 108-10 
[Sunstein, Legal Reasoning]).  
221 Khullar, supra note 29. The commissioner colourfully describes the FEBC’s ambiguity as part of 
a recurring approach: “Some might say it is the Canadian way of muddling through” (ibid.). 
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problem. Constraints draw attention to process and often catalyze cycles of partisan 
procedural manipulation. A first reason for preferring ambiguous design, then, is that 
it can help avoid the traps of regulation by constraint. Lessig writes that ambiguous 
regulation “functions not by clarifying, but by blurring.”222 In short, ambiguity 
“confuses”.223 “[W]hile we ordinarily think of law as functioning to clarify 
obligations and norms,” he notes, “here it functions by obscuring what was clear.”224 
One application that Lessig does not contemplate is the use of ambiguous rules of 
decision making to avoid the hazards of constraint. Commissioners note that the 
thoroughly ambiguous FEBC rules provide no overriding theory or central 
authority.225 The rules therefore present little of the clarity and focus that elsewhere 
prompt decision makers to compete and try to win changes to procedure that are 
favourable to themselves. By avoiding rule clarity and the partisanship it catalyzes, 
ambiguity can be a practical means of promoting impartiality. 
 Importantly, ambiguous rules can also go some way toward solving a difficult 
problem: avoiding the clear rules that catalyze partisanship but keeping commissions 
nonetheless bound by rules. In this way, ambiguous rules potentially improve on the 
laissez-faire approach that Issacharoff and others promote. Issacharoff, as we saw, 
advocates withdrawing key constraint rules under the VRA to encourage the 
development of informal norms of impartial democratic regulation.226 That constraint 
rules often catalyze partisan conflict is a powerful argument against them. But it does 
not necessarily commend an alternative laissez-faire strategy of withdrawing most 
rules. Decision making ought in general to remain rule-bound, in part for the 
straightforward reason that democratic regulation should not be arbitrary. A 
commission should not, for example, select boundaries without a stipulated set of 
governing criteria and procedures.227 Regulation should pursue rational ends such as 
allowing cohesive social groups to vote together as constituents in a single riding. A 
laissez-faire solution may or may not see decision makers develop boundary-drawing 
practices that are based on rational criteria. In contrast with laissez-faire approaches, 
ambiguous regulation does not eliminate rules, but rather maintains them and makes 
them more numerous, complex, and conflictual.  
2. Promoting Broad Impartiality 
 Avoiding arbitrary decision making is just one reason why keeping an ambiguous 
set of rules in place can be advantageous. Ambiguous rules may also promote 
impartial judgment in accordance with the broader of the two models of impartiality 
 
222 Lessig, supra note 26 at 1010. 
223 Ibid. at 1016. 
224 Ibid. at 1015. 
225 See Part IV.B.3. 
226 Issacharoff, “Section 5”, supra note 105. 
227 The most extreme laissez-faire model would return carriage over readjustment to legislatures 
acting through regular acts of legislation. 
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outlined in Part II. Recall that decision making following the broad model draws on 
diverse and even incompatible sources: facts and arguments of numerous kinds and 
from numerous contributors, heard by various decision makers, and embodied in 
complex networks of informal norms. Decisions following the alternative, balance 
model of impartiality are products of compromise between mutually opposed groups 
or interests.  
 Ambiguous rules are more consistent with broad impartiality than with 
impartiality as balance for at least three reasons. First, ambiguous rules do not 
artificially simplify decision making as both constraint and balance impartiality tend 
to. Broad impartiality—nuanced and richly varied—is inherently ambiguous. Clearly 
articulating what would make a decision maker more impartial in a given context is 
often not feasible. One commissioner says of the FEBCs, for example, that their 
“criteria inevitably cannot be clearer.”228 Considerations thought essential to the 
process include defining discrete communities and fitting them within electoral 
boundaries. These considerations conflict with a host of other criteria, depend on 
judgments about the value of assorted communities, and yield no obvious single 
boundary line.229 Indeed, ambiguous and contested criteria and procedures 
predominate in almost any context of democratic regulation.230 Legislation therefore 
seldom sets out with any precision the standards that inform broadly impartial 
decision making. More commonly, indistinct informal customs embody these elusive 
standards and their “[c]uriosities, anomalies and contradictions.”231 Yet there is a 
powerful inclination among reformers to systematize and simplify. From time to time 
we see calls for clarifying language, as in Milliken’s and Lortie’s proposals to give 
more definite meaning to “communities of interest”,232 and Hasen’s preference for a 
 
228 An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29 (“[i]t just cannot happen”). Courtney similarly 
acknowledges that “clarification” of “statutes and guidelines” of the FEBCs is not likely to remedy 
their imprecision and elusiveness (supra note 12 at 259). 
229 For example, FEBC commissioners generate computer models to consider how a slight 
boundary shift affects district demographics. See Interview of Jean-Pierre Kingsley (5 July 2007) 
[unpublished, on file with author]. Based on seemingly simple hard numbers, this process is actually 
profoundly complex when several ethnic, linguistic, socio-economic, or other groups occupy and 
effectively compete over one geographic space, especially in major urban centres. Other factors are 
still less deterministic and less amenable to numeric analysis, such as local history and considerations 
of social justice.  
230 See e.g. judicial appointments (Weinrib, supra note 127 at 110) and defining election campaign 
rules (Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 102). More generally and across many contexts, some 
commentators now view considerable ambiguity as inevitable and doubt whether rule of law 
principles of clarity and predictability are realistic. See e.g. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. 
ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969) at 33-94 (the noted rule of law principles); 
Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 220 at 102-06 (casting doubt on the principles).  
231 Elizabeth Longford, “Prelude” in Lord Longford, A History of the House of Lords (Thrupp, 
U.K.: Sutton, 1999) 10 at 10 (informal norms of governance). 
232 Milliken Report, supra note 98, vol. 3 at 33:25. 
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seamless web of impartial criteria for regulating politics.233 Impartiality as balance 
similarly elucidates and refines questions up for determination. But it thereby 
arranges complex policy considerations along an artificially small number of clear 
poles, such as Democrat versus Republican, or white versus black or Latino.234 In its 
tendency to polarize and distort complex issues into reductive and binary terms, 235 
this form of decision making is thus incompatible with the nuance of broad 
impartiality.236 
 Ambiguous rules do not constrain decision making or subject it to a clear series 
of conditions. The rules are written down, but beyond this basic clarity they are 
markedly open-ended. They set out criteria and procedures that only guide decision 
making at the outset, without clarifying how the rules should interact with one 
another—or how they should apply to redistricting.237 Says one commissioner, “While 
we were aware we were to consider community of interest or identity and history 
pattern, how we would do that was left up to us.”238 Ambiguous rules, even though 
they are written, are therefore most similar to the contradictory, vague—in short, 
ambiguous—informal norms of democratic regulation. The former, then, avoid the 
artificial simplifications of both balance impartiality and constraint.  
 Second, ambiguous rules also appear actively to promote broad impartiality. They 
can improve on most of the traditional strategies of formal regulation, which define 
impartiality in ever-more precise terms, counterbalance decision makers of opposite 
views, or simply exhort commissioners to be impartial. A laissez-faire regulation 
strategy does little to ensure that decision making will develop following the broader 
impartiality model. And a bare exhortation to be impartial may be little more likely to 
ensure broad impartiality than laissez-faire.239 In contrast, ambiguous rules can go a 
step further and lead decision makers through numerous processes of deliberation, as 
is typical of broad impartiality. Complex sets of rules like those of the FEBCs can 
direct decision makers to range broadly in their work. Each substantive rule pushes 
 
233 None of these reformers goes the next step and states a full range of specific rules. Note also that 
these are examples of the constraint approach to regulation. Balance impartiality is at root a variety of 
constraint, in light of the similarities outlined in this section. 
234 See Pildes, supra note 25 at 968. For the example of the U.S. Federal Elections Commission, see 
supra note 137. 
235 See Jacobson, supra note 9 at 27; Michelman, “Suspicion”, supra note 71 at 680. 
236 See Pildes, supra note 25 (noting how formal laws of democratic regulation can displace more 
nuanced norms of trust and trustworthiness). 
237 On the distinction between “guiding” rules and constraining rules see e.g. Joseph Raz, “The Rule 
of Law and Its Virtue” (1977) 93 Law Q. Rev. 195 at 198; T.R.S. Allan, “The Rule of Law as the Rule 
of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism” (1999) 115 Law Q. Rev. 221 at 225-27. 
238 An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29. 
239 Some observers, such as Canada’s former long-serving Chief Electoral Officer, Jean-Pierre 
Kingsley, believe in the effectiveness of such exhortations (Kingsley, supra note 228). Note that the 
EBRA does not explicitly state impartiality is its goal, though the point is certainly implicit. But in this 
implicit sense all readjustment commissions call on decision makers to be impartial, including some 
that are in practice impartial and also others that are not. 
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deliberation in a new direction and each procedural step pushes decision makers into 
discourse and cooperation with other participants. Going beyond a vague exhortation 
to be impartial, FEBC rules instead direct decision makers to deliberate and interact 
broadly—to act like broadly impartial decision makers. 
 Broad impartiality avoids focusing on procedural exploitation, unduly rigid 
ideology, or narrow sets of social interests. Open therefore to any cogent and relevant 
argument, it is in this sense relatively rational.240 In practical terms, being “exposed to 
the full blast of ... sundry opinions,”241 and to each other, decision makers should be 
more sensitive to perspectives that they otherwise would not encounter. Analysts 
often make this suggestion, albeit more typically in the context of the broader public 
arena.242 A rational model of decision making should, in turn, be particularly 
egalitarian because it is amenable to all helpful submissions of fact and argument, 
including public submissions. As Joseph Raz describes this ideal, fact and argument 
persuade according to their inherent informational or rational value, and not as a 
function of the contributor’s formal power.243 Indeed, in comments that Courtney 
broadly affirms,244 FEBC commissioners report being strongly influenced by citizen 
submissions regarding facts on the ground in a given community.245 One 
commissioner reports, “We took very seriously the objections and proposals 
presented to us and tried to accommodate community sentiment as we understood it 
from the hearings. We extensively redrew our initial map in response to public 
submissions.”246 In fact, another commissioner notes that “[b]y and large we 
welcomed the submissions, more so from the public than the politicians.”247 Still 
 
240 The literature contrasts partisanship with “impartial”, “principled” or “reasoned decision on an 
issue on its merits” (Hasen, supra note 12 at 974-79, 982; Kari Palonen, “Four Times of Politics: 
Policy, Polity, Politicking, and Politicization” (2003) 28 Alternatives 171). See also Nedelsky, supra 
note 74. Economic notions of rationality based on self-interest offer another, very different 
understanding. 
241 Michelman, “Brennan”, supra note 79. 
242 Mazzone, supra note 25 at 51 (“[A] person who, because of her participation in civic networks, 
is accustomed to negotiation and compromise may be less demanding and less selfish in her daily 
transactions with others than someone who has never learned similar cooperative habits”); Jon Elster, 
“The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory” in James Bohman & William Rehg, 
eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997) 3 
at 12 (describing similar effects in the context of democratic discourse). 
243 Morality, supra note 185 at 29.  
244 Supra note 12 at 136. 
245 There are of course exceptions. One commissioner reports learning that four unusually 
knowledgeable constituents who made submissions had been coached by members of an affected 
political party (An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29). 
246 An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29. Two commissioners recall public submissions, on 
issues such as ease of transportation in ridings and keeping “communities more intact,” being highly 
influential (Two anonymous commissioners, supra note 29). See also Kingsley, supra note 229 
(public submissions “significantly impact” the process). 
247 An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29 (“[t]he politicians’ submissions were more political 
and were received as such”). Parliamentarians’ submissions are influential primarily when “echoed by 
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another commissioner relates that the submissions were “[a]bsolutely crucial” and led 
to “huge changes. ... Public submissions are key inputs into the whole thing.”248 These 
reports suggest that at least some ambiguous processes satisfy the prediction of 
relatively rational decision making sensitive to cogent public contributions. 
 Third and finally, an ambiguous system makes balance impartiality difficult to 
sustain. A complex set of incommensurable and unpredictable rules scrambles the 
delicate balances of power on which this form of impartiality is premised. With a 
chaotic multiplicity of rules and players such as that of the FEBCs, it may be harder 
to sustain conceptual simplifications, clear polarities, and counterbalanced interests. 
To illustrate this point, I will begin with the case of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Observers typically recognize the polarization of its deliberations between two 
political blocs: “conservative” and “liberal”.249 The neatness of this distinction is 
striking, imposed as it is on a much more plural range of ideologies held by members 
of the court and the broader public. The United States Senate’s two-party polarization 
seems to bring order to an otherwise chaotic array of libertarians and moral 
conservatives, liberals and class-conscious leftists, originalists and textualists, and 
many others.250 In comparison, polarization is less likely given a set of poles whose 
number and relative positions are obscure and ever-changing. When ambiguous 
arrangements disrupt conceptual simplifications, a decision maker’s personal 
alignment with a single umbrella ideology is less tenable. Justices of the Supreme 
Court of Canada evidently maintain an intelligible but relatively broad set of 
ideological perspectives. The set is large and chaotic enough to frustrate, at least in 
part, alliances and ideological cohesion among the judges. Indeed, Canada’s highest 
court issues decisions that are generally less predictable in their results than those of 
the Supreme Court of the United States.251 
 If decision makers cannot sustain conceptual simplifications, they may be more 
likely to address the substance of an issue relatively free of predisposition. For this 
reason it again follows that ambiguous systems should produce relatively rational 
judgment. Additionally, because ambiguity scrambles alliances and policy 
simplifications, decision making should be relatively cooperative. This is a 
characteristic often ascribed to trusted, trustworthy, and impartial decision making.252 
In comparison with balance impartiality and constraint approaches, it should be 
uncommon to see decision makers compete as mutually distrustful partisans.253 In 
                                                                                                                                       
community input” (ibid.). Some “had useful observations, but many just wanted to make the 
Commission the target of attacks, and that was not helpful” (ibid.). 
248 An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29. 
249 Jacobson, supra note 9 at 27. 
250 Ibid. 
251 See generally Peter McCormick, “Follow the Leader: Judicial Power and Judicial Leadership on 
the Laskin Court, 1973–1984” (1998) 24 Queen’s L.J. 237 at 268; “Birds of a Feather: Alliances and 
Influences on the Lamer Court 1990–1997” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339. 
252 See supra note 189. 
253 Part of the intent—and certainly the effect—of balancing opposed decision makers off of each 
other is to have them hold each other in mutual check. Each is watchful for offences by the other, and 
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practice, many commissioners report not perceiving each other as competitors, but 
rather deciding cooperatively through collective deliberation and even consensus. As 
one commissioner notes, “Decision making was highly cooperative. We listened to 
one another’s suggestions and ideas and made decisions based on what seemed to 
work best. It was consensus reasoning.”254 The same appears to have been the case in 
several FEBCs.255 
3. Precluding Partisanship 
 Under the previous two headings, an assumption was that decision makers intend 
in good faith to make impartial decisions when possible.256 An alternative assumption 
is more cynical, and more common. The bulk of writers who analyze ambiguous 
decision making systems start from the premise that decision makers are partisans. 
These analysts assert that the efforts of partisans are less effective amid ambiguity. 
Given ambiguous procedures and legal norms, partisan decision makers might be less 
able to predict how manipulating procedures will affect their own fortunes.257  
 A helpful example comes out of a recent work by Adam Cox, who presents one 
of several new contributions characterizing ambiguity as a tool of legal regulation.258 
His contribution is also a rare application of ambiguity scholarship to readjustment in 
particular. Cox praises the longstanding rule mandating a long period of time, a 
“temporal floor”, between rounds of readjustment. One intention is to “curb the 
effects of partisan gerrymandering” by “promot[ing] beneficial uncertainty in the 
redistricting process.”259 Cox explains that “[w]hile redistricting authorities can make 
some predictions about voting behavior, ... the accuracy of those predictions 
decreases as one moves further in time from the point of prediction.”260 The 
observation is a clever one. It identifies a familiar element of readjustment as a source 
of ambiguity. Readjustment is at root a response to the changing demographics of 
electoral districts. Long periods between the drawing of district maps and their use in 
elections can produce marked unpredictability; most North-American electoral 
districts undergo sizeable demographic shifts over a ten-year timeframe.261 Until 
recently in both Canada and the United States, readjustment occurred on a fixed 
                                                                                                                                       
each seeks to block and counter the attempts of others to gain the upper hand in democratic regulation. 
See e.g. Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, “The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary” (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 at 1156; The Federalist, supra note 100, No. 48 (Madison) 
at 311. 
254 An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29.  
255 See Khullar, supra note 29 (“the three of us worked well together, and I guess also shared some 
fundamental values of how to approach the task”). See also Kingsley, supra note 228. 
256 They will seize the opportunity to manipulate rules in their favour perhaps only if opponents 
otherwise will do so. 
257 Issacharoff calls this “ends-oriented manipulation” (“Gerrymandering,” supra note 9 at 595). 
258 Supra note 7. 
259 Ibid. at 769. 
260 Ibid. at 769-70. 
261 See generally Pal & Choudhry, supra note 160 at 4-5. 
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decennial timetable. However, over the past few years, Texas and four other states 
have sought to readjust districts outside the traditional cycle.262 In its recent ruling on 
the Texas readjustment controversy, the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
a decennial floor rule is not constitutionally required, potentially weakening this 
temporal-ambiguity feature in the United States.263 But the floor rule fortunately 
remains a constitutional requirement in Canada.264  
 Offering another intriguing example, Jason Mazzone identifies how some forms 
of federalism generate ambiguities precluding partisan decision making:  
An ambiguous division of power ... creates uncertainty regarding which 
government, national or state, will eventually make the decisions on a particular 
matter. This ambiguity in turn casts doubt on the merits of pursuing one avenue 
of influence rather than another.265  
 Finally, in a growing subset of ambiguity cases, commentators elevate an insight 
of John Rawls from thought experiment to practical tool of regulation. In Rawls’ 
celebrated hypothetical case, founders of a political community, being oblivious to 
their own identities, elaborate its features without self-interest.266 A number of later 
authors imagine concrete applications. These mostly appear in contexts where 
entrenchment is a live risk, such as at a time of constitutional amendment. In one 
recent effort to rewrite the founding document of a developing state emerging from 
conflict, international advisors called for a “Rawlsian moment”.267 The country’s first 
elections were to be held only after passage of the new constitution, which would 
spell out the powers of incumbent governments.268 To the advisors’ disappointment, 
the elections went ahead before completion of the constitution, and the elected party 
wrote, as predicted, wide governing powers into the new document. Several works 
address analogous effects in other contexts, ranging from the determination of health 
care rights to the design of basic constitutional rules.269 In Canadian electoral-
boundary readjustment, John Courtney notes that the perennial minority governments 
of the 1960s probably helped prompt Parliament to create the FEBCs.270 With that 
decade’s uncertain electoral prospects for political parties, incumbents could not rely 
on holding power for long, and could count even less on controlling the next 
 
262 See Cox, supra note 7 at 751-52. 
263 See Perry, supra note 4. 
264 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 48, s. 51. However, it should be noted that Parliament 
breached the rule, apparently for partisan purposes, with a two-year delay in the early 1990s 
(Landes, supra note 29). 
265 Supra note 25 at 57-58. 
266 A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
267 For this account I am indebted to John Barker of the University of Cambridge, a member of the 
Malawi advisory group.  
268 Ibid. 
269 See e.g. Russell Korobkin, “Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of Ignorance” 
(1998) U. Ill. L. Rev. 801; Adrian Vermeule, “Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law” (2001) 
111 Yale L.J. 399. 
270 Supra note 12 at 44-52. 
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readjustment. The parties’ unpredictable futures apparently provided some incentive 
to place readjustment in the hands of independent commissions, and to bring more 
impartiality to readjustment. 
 In Part IV, I will discuss how the FEBC system’s elaborate set of ambiguous 
features generates unpredictable outcomes and, among other effects, precludes 
partisanship. It is sufficient for now to note that the unpredictable system would 
confound attempts to draw partisan lines. “Most of the time, we don’t even know the 
effect anyway,” one commissioner states, referring to how readjustment impacts 
election outcomes.271 
4. Developing Informal Decision-Making Norms  
 An important benefit of ambiguous systems is their potential to promote the 
development of informal norms of trust, trustworthiness, and impartiality. Formal 
rules, however cleverly designed, generally leave open loopholes that committed 
partisans may seek and exploit: the unusual shapes of gerrymandered districts are 
prominent examples. However, the FEBCs’ ambiguous design apparently promotes 
impartiality that is reinforced in norms of trust and trustworthiness—or, in the words 
of one commissioner, in the “mythology [of] the neutral fair system. ... The ambiguity 
and mythology work[]” in concert in this way.272 Indeed, we might expect at least 
some of the effects outlined above—ending process fixation, promoting broad 
impartiality, and precluding partisanship—to produce corresponding changes in the 
attitudes and habits of decision makers. Sustained over time, these aspects of 
impartial decision making may solidify into informal norms as members of the public 
and decision makers themselves come to expect impartial decision making.273 The 
idea of discernible institutional cultures developing over long periods of time is 
widespread.274 Lessig’s own illustration of “behavioral” regulation,275 as we saw, 
raises the examples of racial-segregation prohibitions and policies mandating a daily 
salute to the flag in schools. Both regulated behaviours inculcate attitudes that in turn 
reinforce desired behaviours by developing lasting informal norms. It must be noted, 
however, that Lessig does not explore the behavioural side of ambiguity methods, but 
rather places them within his “semiotic” category.276 Nevertheless, if ambiguous 
 
271 An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29. Another anonymous commissioner adds that 
“decisions [do] not appear to be ... geared to manipulating electoral outcomes” (supra note 29). 
272 Khullar, supra note 29. In addition, an anonymous commissioner cites the importance of 
developing “symbolic legitimacy” (supra note 29). 
273 As noted, trust and trustworthiness are premised on decision makers’ and others’ expectations of 
good decision making (Braithwaite, supra note 19 at 344-47; Jones, supra note 90). Note the 
alternative possibility that partisans will find and exploit loopholes before trust develops. 
274 See e.g. Heather Gerken, “Second-Order Diversity” (2006) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1099 at 1147. 
275 Lessig, supra note 26 at 1008. See also e.g. the remarks of Koh in Toope et al., supra note 129 at 
38 (describing a process of “norm internalization, driven by legal process” [emphasis in original]); 
Mazzone, supra note 25 at 57-58. 
276 Lessig, ibid.  
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systems produce decision making that is at first impartial in effect, the behavioural 
insight suggests that cultures of impartiality should develop over time. 
 Less straightforwardly, ambiguous systems can facilitate the development of 
complex relations among decision makers that characterize trust, trustworthiness, and 
broad impartiality. As we saw, commentators commonly describe trust and 
trustworthiness as sustained in dense networks of rules, values, symbols, social 
meanings, agreements, social bonds, organizations, and loyalties. An ambiguous 
complex of rules and participants can lay the groundwork for developing these 
informal norms. That groundwork can in turn put decision makers in a position to 
begin cooperating and deciding rationally.277 This idea has precedents in a number of 
contexts. For example, Mazzone points to how “Progressive Era reformers ... sought 
to increase [trust in the public arena] in the United States by creating networks of 
voluntary associations.”278 Mazzone and another author, Denise Scheberle, creatively 
and persuasively reread the dynamics of governance in the United States by 
suggesting how dispersing power into complex forms can engender trust, and by 
concentrating on the development of trust amid U.S. federalism.279 Theories of urban 
planning provide a further, and better known, example out of a loosely analogous 
context. Some authors call for municipalities to adopt relatively complex 
arrangements of physical structures, businesses, public services, and demographics. 
The aim is to mimic—and thereby perhaps to seed—the dense networks of 
interpersonal interactions and trust, and the richness and variety of advantages, that 
usually characterize communities that are safe, economically viable, and appealing.280 
 Returning to the FEBCs, we have seen that these bodies feature a host of 
complexities, such as broad consultation, diverse decision makers, and a richly 
convoluted substantive decision-making framework. By engaging its assorted 
participants together in this circuitous process for over two years, the FEBC system 
may have encouraged the development of informal networks of trust among its 
participants. These participants include the commissioners, organized civil-society 
groups such as farmers’ representatives, municipal-government representatives (who 
are among the most common participants in the federal readjustment process), 
 
277 We have already seen a number of examples of informal rules, values, symbols, and social 
meanings in references to cultures of cooperation; to impartiality as a distinct, if tenuous, mythology, 
to public perceptions of FEBC trustworthiness, and to egalitarian ethic regarding submissions to the 
FEBCs, which in turn invites robust public involvement. Under the present heading, I will focus more 
on agreements, social bonds, organizations, and loyalties among decision-making participants. 
278 Supra note 25 at 36.  
279 Denise Scheberle suggests that one of the many effects of complex federalism can be enhancing 
relations of trust. Looking at case studies in environmental regulation, Scheberle traces the 
development of trust amid networks of interactions among federal and state governments—sometimes 
finding surprising levels of cooperation (Scheberle, supra note 176). To be sure, neither author 
suggests that trust pervades at every level of U.S. governance. 
280 See e.g. Peter Katz, The New Urbanism: Towards an Architecture of Community (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1994).  
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representatives of First Nations governments, individuals speaking as members of 
identity groups such as the New Brunswick Acadians, other interested individuals, 
and MPs affected by proposed changes.281 A simpler decision-making system might 
see just a few decision makers exercising clear decision-making control, thereby 
overshadowing the roles of diverse public and private participants.282 The example of 
the FEBCs suggests that in some cases of democratic regulation a valuable design 
strategy may be to avoid unambiguous lines of top-down control. Relatively 
numerous and variegated power arrangements can prompt the development of the 
complex normative networks that can in turn help solidify trust, trustworthiness, and 
impartiality in decision making. 
IV. The Scope and Limits of Ambiguous Systems 
A. Extending Ambiguous Regulation 
 We have seen that ambiguity methods address the risk of entrenchment by 
counterintuitively blurring the lines within which decision makers exercise power. An 
important question is how far we can push this strategy. Going beyond Lessig’s 
conception, decision making can feature not one but many sources of ambiguity to 
yield the benefits outlined in the previous part. However, some writers assume that 
 
281 See supra notes 227-32, 237-39. See also Federal Elections Boundaries Commission for 
Alberta, “Part III: Summary of Submissions and Post-Hearing Decisions” in Report of the Federal 
Electoral Boundaries Commission for Alberta (15 January 2003), online: Elections Canada 
<http://www.elections.ca/SCRIPTS/FEDREP/alberta/report/part3_e.htm> (citing involvement of 
municipal representatives); Federal Elections Boundaries Commission for Manitoba, Report of the 
Federal Electoral Boundaries Commission for Manitoba (15 January 2003), online: Elections 
Canada <http://www.elections.ca/SCRIPTS/FEDREP/manitoba/report/report_e.htm> (citing involvement of 
Manitoba’s Southern Chiefs’ Organization); Federal Elections Boundaries Commission for New Brunswick, 
Report of the Federal Electoral Boundaries Commission for New Brunswick (10 January 2003), App. C, 
online: Elections Canada <http://www.elections.ca/SCRIPTS/FEDREP/newbruns/report/appc_e. 
htm> (citing involvement of Patton MacDonald, a representative of New Brunswick farmers). 
282 Note that this suggests a further form of evidence of robust public influence in the 
ambiguous FEBC processes. Adopting reasoning apparently in the mode of rational-choice 
analysis, Mazzone argues that trust develops when “dividing power between the national 
government and the states provides greater opportunities for citizen groups to influence politics 
and for individual citizens to participate in public life” (supra note 25 at 27). Mazzone argues 
that federal divisions of power thereby engender “trust”, “cooperation”, and “social justice”. 
However, evidence for this particular claim appears to be mixed. Mazzone claims that “[g]roups 
like the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”) ... are likely to dominate in a 
[unitary] system” (ibid. at 44). In contrast, federal systems require such large groups to focus on 
many sites of influence—for example, on fifty state governments—and “federalism provides 
opportunities for smaller, weaker organizations to compete for influence and pursue their 
agendas. In a federalist system, it is easier for smaller organizations to mount opposition to even 
powerful groups because [larger groups’] resources will be more diffused” (ibid. at 45). Whether 
Mazzone is right depends on a number of particulars, such as the actual size, and therefore the 
state-level influence, of groups such as the AARP. 
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extensive ambiguity and unpredictability produce poor functionality.283 I address such 
concerns in this part. I outline limiting conditions for the extensive use of ambiguity 
as a tool of democratic regulation and provide examples illustrating these conditions 
both generally and more specifically within the contexts of readjustment in Canada 
and the United States. Successful applications of the ambiguity methods I have 
outlined appear to meet three conditions: equivalence, stability, and 
comprehensiveness. 
B. Conditions for Extended Ambiguity 
1. Equivalence 
 Ambiguous systems should firstly fulfill an “equivalence” condition: roughly 
speaking, they must function equally as well as clearer and more predictable 
alternatives.  
 Democratic-regulation cases often meet this condition. In scholarship on such 
cases, there has been a longstanding recognition that no single model of government 
accommodates all the factors that potentially contribute to good democratic design.284 
For example, a perennial question is how to ensure that voters will express their own 
substantive electoral preferences, rather than preferences influenced by “irrational” 
considerations such as group allegiances and polls.285 A common practice in Canada 
is the polling blackout as elections near.286 However, an alternative can be to adopt a 
circuitous route from individual votes to electoral outcomes.287 This approach is less 
likely to raise free expression concerns and is somewhat common in voting systems 
in other countries—for example, in “mixed” systems in which voters simultaneously 
vote via “majoritarian” and “proportional” voting models.288 An ambiguous voting 
 
283 See e.g. Karlan, “Fire”, supra note 39 at 733-35, 741, n. 7; Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra 
note 220 at 102-06. In one interesting work, M. Elizabeth Magill analogizes the confusing American 
case law on the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the chaos of the “three-
body problem” known to physicists (M. Elizabeth Magill, “The Real Separation in Separation of 
Powers Law” (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127 at 1128-29). In another context see generally Fitzpatrick, 
who discusses chaotic informal norms of property use generating failure in property-rights regimes 
(supra note 95). 
284 See Kenneth Arrow, “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare” (1950) 58 Journal of 
Political Economy 328 at 328-331.  
285 See e.g. André Blais & Robert Young, “Why do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality” 
(1999) 99 Public Choice 39 at 39-40; Guy Lachapelle, Polls and the Media in Canadian Elections: 
Taking the Pulse, vol. 16 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991) at 13-14. 
286 See J. Andrew Fraser, “The Blackout of Opinion Polls: An Assault on Popular Sovereignty” 
(1995) 4 Media and Communications Law Review 365 at 379-80. 
287 See Richard Johnston et al., Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election 
(Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1992) at 197-98 (factors controlling strategic voting). 
288 New Zealand, Italy, and Israel, among others, employ mixed systems. See Pippa Norris, 
“Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems” (1997) 18 International 
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system of this kind can make the connection between a vote and electing a particular 
government more unpredictable, in turn diminishing considerations of process and 
strategy. Citizens are more likely, then, to vote based on their substantive policy 
preferences. Importantly, the more unpredictable process still leaves unimpeded the 
right to cast a vote;289 the example illustrates how different options for voting-system 
design can function equally well. 
 Some ambiguity techniques will not satisfy the equivalence condition. For 
example, certain regulatory problems cannot be approached piecemeal. There are 
many cases where ambiguous systems prevent coordination or institute through 
discrete steps decisions that should be made at the level of the complex whole. 
Indeed, ambiguity is often a burden for federal systems. One example is the problem 
of urban revitalization in Canada and the difficulties of reaching agreement among 
the three levels of government. Redevelopment plans can stall for years as 
ambiguously divided powers frustrate any coherent plan.290 But the full story of 
federalism is complex and, as already noted, federalism can have positive effects such 
as precluding partisanship. 
a. Equivalence in Readjustment 
 How might a readjustment regime as ambiguous as Canada’s be less effective 
than simpler systems, even if it is more impartial? There are at least two 
possibilities.291 The first and primary consideration should be whether the FEBCs 
follow appropriate substantive readjustment criteria as well as other systems do. By 
nearly all accounts the FEBCs diligently follow the rules that govern them.292 As in 
the case of voting, there are rules producing unpredictable outcomes—due here to the 
elaborate and conflictual criteria and procedures as well as the diverse participants 
involved. The FEBCs nevertheless consistently readjust electoral maps by following 
the substantive criteria set out in cases and legislation. As noted in the previous part, 
rules continue to guide readjustment, even if the rules are ambiguous as a whole. 
However, we cannot indefinitely continue adding substantive criteria to a 
                                                                                                                                       
Political Science Review 297. Note however that mixed systems can also be simple, for example if 
they distribute legislative seats based primarily on the proportional vote. 
289 Note however that there is arguably democratic value in voting strategically—and generally in 
the power not only to express a position but also to exert concrete influence over which political party 
triumphs in an election. There is no correct answer in this debate; where one comes out in it depends 
on how much weight one ascribes to the different democratic values in conflict. However, the debate 
illustrates the broader point about the equivalence of several design options. 
290 The city of Toronto has faced this problem since basic plans for a renewed waterfront were 
announced in 2000. Antagonistic federal, provincial, and city governments have attempted in vain to 
coordinate and have made at best only halting progress. See Jennifer Lewington, “Waterfront 
Revitalization Gets New Lease on Life” Globe and Mail (28 July 2004) A9. 
291 A third possibility is that ambiguous systems are ineffective given the “room in which to hide” 
that flexibility and ambiguity might give partisans aiming to manipulate procedures (Carter, supra 
note 98 at 58). However, the main thrust of this article aims to refute that argument. 
292 See Courtney, supra note 12. 
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readjustment system; the criteria must play rational roles, such as directing 
commissioners to consider the locations of cohesive groups. Given the expansiveness 
of the current set of substantive criteria for readjustment, the list of criteria cannot 
likely become longer without veering toward irrelevance.  
 A number of years ago Issacharoff interestingly called for the randomization of 
readjustment.293 The computer-generated maps he contemplated would have little 
relation to the locations of cohesive communities and other traditional readjustment 
factors. This approach would sacrifice most other ends of readjustment to the cause of 
impartiality. The merits of the approach cannot be dismissed entirely, given the 
partisan state of much American readjustment. But circumstances in Canada do not 
call for such radical solutions. The Raîche case, for one, demonstrates the importance 
to certain cultural minorities of unified representation and of members voting together 
as coherent units in elections.294 In the controversy leading up to Raîche, many New-
Brunswick Acadians forcefully argued against their transfer to an Anglophone 
riding.295 
 A second possible consideration affecting equivalence is the democratic 
legitimacy of different readjustment systems. Legislatures arguably bring larger 
measures of democracy to the task of readjustment. Robert Post argues that only 
elected representative bodies have the legitimacy to define the basic ground rules of a 
democracy.296 The FEBCs are appointed bodies, and their ambiguous procedures 
effectively block internal decision making from public view and in this sense prevent 
public accountability. Nevertheless, the commissions’ democratic legitimacy appears, 
if anything, to be stronger than that of legislatures. One important consideration is 
that representative democracy is not the only way in which a democracy can function. 
Taking citizens’ submissions directly, where it is feasible to do so, can be more 
effective. As we saw in the previous part, the ambiguous FEBC system places all 
contributors, from MPs to lay citizens, on roughly equal footing. The commissions’ 
democratic bona fides are in this respect arguably at least as strong as Parliament’s. 
We also previously saw a more straightforward democratic argument for FEBCs. 
Throughout much of Canada’s history, Parliament often did not write the ground rules 
of the democratic process in a fair manner. There is no legitimate democratic 
 
293 Samuel Issacharoff, “Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political 
Fairness” (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1643 at 1647, 1693-95. 
294 Supra note 153. The desire for joint representation raises intriguing questions about the function 
of a democratic vote. When a community votes as a discrete unit, there is no guarantee that members 
will vote together for any given party. Nevertheless, the voters involved in litigation and other forms 
of advocacy, including the 2656 Acadians who signed a petition sent to the province’s FEBC, 
apparently saw voting together as a way to preserve their community. 
295 Ibid. at paras. 11-15. 
296 Robert Post, “Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review” (1998) 86 Cal. L. Rev. 429 
at 432. 
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prerogative permitting legislators to gerrymander unfettered, and thereby to remain in 
power contrary to public wishes.297 
2. Stability 
 The stability and “prospectivity” of rules are facets of the rule of law.298 There is a 
risk that an unusually complex process will fall apart over time and stop guiding 
governance. On the other hand, even chaotic systems can be stable systems. A 
decision-making process can persist over time, consistently yielding a given type of 
decision even if the details of decisions are unpredictable.  
 I return first to the example of voting systems. These can function in a 
dependable manner, establishing governments according to a reliable election cycle 
even if an election result cannot be determined in advance. Ambiguity as a tool for 
regulating politics must, in general, be similarly stable because entrenchment is a 
constant risk, not a fleeting possibility. Merely transient ambiguities such as those 
described by Lessig—intermediate states that dissipate once cultural change has 
occurred—therefore have limited value. Thus in the judicial-selection conflict at the 
United States Senate, ambiguities that arose during lag periods when parties adjusted 
to unfamiliar rules were quickly resolved and clarity ensued. But other cases offer 
examples of stable ambiguity in democratic regulation. An early and interesting 
example is that of the French administrative divisions, or “départements”, which were 
designed by the Abbé Sièyes during the Revolutionary era and persist to the present 
day. These geographic subunits “violated the territorial integrity of [existing] 
provinces”—which were far fewer in number and reflected regional loyalties—with 
the deliberate intention of reducing cleavages within the nation.299 In the words of a 
modern commentator, the plan’s supporters “adopted this ambiguous strategy of 
decentralizing the administrative system in order to regenerate the state.”300 The 
system did clarify things in one sense: “Through this hierarchical organization of 
space, the rights of citizens and the unity of the nation would be guaranteed.”301 But 
the new structure also deliberately cut across geographic lines and historic 
communities, dividing the country into several-hundred units in order to blur 
divisions and durably construct French national unity. 
 
297 See Klarman, supra note 17 at 498 (noting that legislatures tend to make anti-majoritarian 
attempts to entrench their own power).  
298 Fuller, supra note 230 at 33-94.  
299 Ted Margadant, Book Review of La formation des départements : la représentation du territoire 
français à la fin du 18e siècle by Marie-Vic Ozouf-Marignier, (1991) 63 Journal of Modern History 
396 at 397.  
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid. 
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a. Stability in Readjustment 
 Though readjustment in Canada is ambiguous in the ways we have seen, it is by 
most accounts stabler than its American counterpart. On a simple level, the well-
established pattern of the FEBCs sees districts take shape on a ten-year cycle, albeit 
with some delays.302 We have already seen that the ten-year cycle has been 
jeopardized in some American states.  
 More importantly, the American commitment to constraint in readjustment 
appears, as in the context of judicial selections, to have generated unstable patterns of 
chaotic lag periods characterized by ambiguity, followed by resolution and clarity. 
U.S. readjustment is complex but not lastingly ambiguous. Courts and other bodies 
have frequently elaborated new rules that produce periods of procedural ambiguity. 
But these periods have been transient. As Issacharoff and others relate, an initial 
period of gains in black voting in the United States was followed by a rise of VRA 
litigation by partisans,303 as political parties moved forcefully into the judicial arena to 
combat one another. Tests centred on racial representation increasingly became mere 
points around which broader political contests focused. The centrality of race in 
conflicts under the VRA has thus diminished since the 1960s and the civil-rights 
era.304 Partisan contest has spread from the courts to the VRA administrative-oversight 
process. Here we are now seeing the VRA enforcement branch displace its long-
standing corps of trusted Justice Department lawyers.305 Observers had recognized in 
these lawyers an ethic of impartial decision making, which rested on a well-
established civil-service culture.306 Though there is a cost in political capital to be 
paid for transgressing informal rules of impartiality, the recent political history of the 
United States has seen these costs diminish, with transgression itself being 
 
302 See Courtney, supra note 12 at 144-48.  
303 Issacharoff notes that the VRA’s early success initially succeeded in breaking up single-party 
dominance in the South, but that this success was in part responsible for the later “partisan tinge” of 
VRA intervention, as the results of intervention in what then became a two-party system carried 
significance for the electoral performance of each party (“Section 5”, supra note 105).  
304 Even Republicans, whose electoral successes among the African-American community are 
limited, have brought VRA challenges to readjustments, ostensibly for their minority representation-
diluting effects. See Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346 (N.J. 2001). Additionally, “causes of action 
under [the] one person, one vote” doctrine have had the “incongruous result of producing plaintiffs 
whose motivation for litigation is almost entirely divorced from the doctrinal basis for their suit” 
(Karlan, “Fire”, supra note 36 at 736). 
305 See Mark Posner, “The Politicization of Justice Department Decisionmaking Under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act: Is it a Problem and What Should Congress Do?” (2006) at 13-15, online: American 
Constitution Society for Law and Policy <http://www.acslaw.org/files/Section%205%20decisionmaking% 
201-30-06.pdf> (describing several forms of politicization, including “precluding career staff from making s. 
5 recommendations” and elevating the influence of political staff in their place”). On the more recent attorney 
firing controversy in the United States, see also text accompanying note 188. 
306 Posner, ibid. at 6. Posner served for several years at the Department of Justice on VRA 
preclearance submissions. 
2008] R. LEVY – ELECTORAL-BOUNDARY POLITICS 53 
 
 
normalized.307 When the political will to breach impartiality norms developed, the 
system failed to respond and protect itself. Partisan manipulation became common 
and helped to rewrite the norms of democratic regulation.308  
3. Comprehensiveness 
 Ambiguity as an effective tool of democratic regulation appears to require not 
one or two, but rather many ambiguous rules—outstripping Lessig’s limited scenarios 
of two norms in conflict. Thus Cox’s floor rule, mentioned above, did not end 
gerrymandering on its own in the United States, nor even in Canada before the 1960s. 
More useful would be a broadly complex and unpredictable process, of which a floor 
rule, for example, might be one contributing part. Most importantly, there should be 
few if any exceptional sources of clarity. These can sustain partisan conflict even in 
an otherwise ambiguous system. Comprehensiveness appears to mark a key 
distinction between the Canadian readjustment scheme and its largely dysfunctional 
American counterpart.  
a. Comprehensiveness and Umpired Readjustment 
 There are mixed features of ambiguity and clarity in U.S. readjustment. As we 
saw, the American case law is now complex and even incoherent;309 some substantive 
rules are markedly ambiguous, such as the test for bizarrely shaped districts.310 On the 
other hand, legislative majorities control most readjustment, including readjustment 
by commission, leaving little mystery as to which political party will come out on top 
in the process. In addition, we saw that the grounds for court and administrative 
review remain conceptually narrow, focusing on minority disenfranchisement rather 
than on fairness at large.  
 Most importantly perhaps, the readiness of a central umpire to settle readjustment 
disputes focuses and clarifies the disputes. The administrative-review mechanism of 
the VRA is statutorily required to be expeditious and is “substantially faster, simpler 
and cheaper” than the judicial alternative.311 It is also the venue of choice in the 
overwhelming majority of cases in states covered by the VRA.312 But even the judicial 
process provides substantially more simplicity, clarification, and central coordination 
than most features of the Canadian system. Courts review federal Canadian 
 
307 More generally in recent years, breaking a culturally based rule of impartiality on one hand has 
carried with it a meaning of political impropriety, while on the other hand it has often led to a 
retroactive redefinition of the rule as having been weak, optional, or outmoded. See Hasen, supra note 
12 at 957-58.  
308 Ibid. See also Karlan, “Fire”, supra note 39 at 736. 
309 See ibid. at 733-35, 741, n. 7. 
310 See supra note 43. 
311 Posner, supra note 305 at 7. 
312 See ibid. 
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readjustment infrequently, and reverse FEBC decisions rarely.313 Moreover, the 
FEBCs are radically decentralized administrators, as I discuss below. The U.S. model 
of umpiring by a central body can render a system inescapably clear and open to 
exploitation. In the present decade, litigation over election disputes has burgeoned 
dramatically,314 a trend that Karlan believes will continue as the “proliferation of 
constraints on the reapportionment process” moves political contests into the 
courts.315 Waiting on a court or administrative body to resolve disputed electoral 
ground rules presumably adds some unpredictability to the system. However, a 
central arbiter lies ready to take over decision making in all instances. Such clear and 
ready litigation provides a focus for partisan conflict.  
b. Comprehensiveness and Decentralized Readjustment 
 Models of decentralized power appear prima facie to improve on umpiring and its 
effect of aggravating partisan conflict. The Canadian FEBC process is comparatively 
decentralized in two important respects. First, there is little countrywide coordination. 
Few cases in the courts produce nationally-prominent disputes over electoral 
boundaries. The ten provincial readjustment commissions work “highly 
independently of one another.”316 “We were not,” reports one commissioner, “aware 
of the specifics of [other FEBCs’] proposals nor the approaches they were taking in 
their decision making.”317 Input by parliamentarians provides a potentially unifying 
national perspective. However, most input and objections filed are in practice 
province- or riding-specific.318 Additionally, Elections Canada is a “passive 
procedural overseer” of readjustment with neither a dispute settlement function nor 
any other substantive decision-making responsibility.319  
 The process is decentralized by design. Debates in Parliament at the inauguration 
of the FEBCs in 1964 show that the government of Lester B. Pearson was aware of 
the confusion ten disparate commissions would bring to readjustment.320 Further, in 
the early days a single national representation commissioner authored first-draft maps 
for the FEBCs to work from, but critics warned against “centralized control over all 
the maps”321 and the office came to an end in 1979.322 In comparison, frequent 
 
313 See Part III.2. 
314 See Hasen, supra note 12 at 958. 
315 “Fire,” supra note 39 at 735. 
316 An anonymous commissioner, supra note 29. 
317 Ibid. See similarly Khullar, supra note 29. 
318 See Elections Canada, supra note 211. 
319 Landes, supra note 29. 
320 House of Commons Debates, Vol. 2, 1964 (16 April 1964) at 2261-64, 2266-67 (various 
speakers). Opposition Conservatives opposed a process that would see many distinct provincial 
interpretations applied to the readjustment criteria of the new act. 
321 Norman Ward, “A Century of Constituencies” (1967) 10 Can. Pub. Admin. 105 at 113. 
322 Harvey Pasis, “Achieving Population Equality among the Constituencies of the Canadian House, 
1903–1976” (1983) 8 Legislative Studies Quarterly 111 at 115, n. 4. 
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litigation in U.S. federal courts under the VRA and the Fourteenth Amendment 
generates a more or less continuous national discourse over readjustment plans in the 
various states.323 In the Texas gerrymandering battle, the United States Senate 
majority leader openly masterminded the plan, and in litigation before the Supreme 
Court of the United States, the administration of President George W. Bush 
intervened in favour of the plan.324  
 Second, there are different levels of central oversight inside each provincial or 
state process. While state legislative majorities generally control readjustment, in 
each provincial FEBC no person, and no group of persons with common interests, 
exercises top-down control. To be sure, the commissioners number only three per 
province—a total that should ideally increase to reduce chances of partisan 
manipulation within a given FEBC.325 However, extensive contributions from the 
public and parliamentarians effectively expand the ranks of decision makers.  
 Decentralization can produce procedural ambiguity, but there are exceptions. For 
example, the judicial-selections system in the United States Senate, which we saw 
previously, has no ultimate umpire (other than, perhaps, the vague and contested 
dictates of popular sentiment). Partisans elaborate rules of procedure by agreement, a 
method that has produced the many layers of rules that we saw. These rules are not 
ambiguous in effect, however, because they respond to balances of power in the 
Senate and evolve along the shifting contours of a power struggle. For example, as 
Republicans raised the threat that they would change filibuster rules, a bloc of 
bipartisan moderates fashioned the noted rule of “extraordinary circumstances”.326 
Better rules would be in place in advance of partisan conflict and would have a 
greater chance of precluding it. A problem with rules that respond to balances of 
power and specific controversies is that they tend to replace, rather than augment, 
earlier rules. Much partisan Senate debate in late stages of Justice Samuel Alito’s 
nomination centred around whether the nomination raised “extraordinary 
circumstances”.327 The same procedural confines even channelled public rhetoric.328 
The extraordinary-circumstances rule was, as we saw, only one of several layers of 
rules. Each had been prominent in a previous stage in the debate, though now 
extraordinary circumstances were key. We can expect similar phenomena in other 
cases in which decision makers who are already partisan develop the rules of their 
own process. A complex system generated out of partisan balance is ultimately rather 
 
323 American journals produce a continuous flow of new works on readjustment, most proposing 
doctrinal tweaks on the constraint model. 
324 See Smith, supra note 1; Charles Lane, “White House Defends Texas’s GOP Remapping Plan to 
Justices” Washington Post (2 February 2006) A3. The court used the opportunity to reassert the role of 
judges as the ultimate arbiters of readjustment (Perry, supra note 4). 
325 But note that Landes cites a risk that “larger Commissions will increase the demand for partisan 
representations” (supra note 29). 
326 Hulse, supra note 121. 
327 Babington & Schmidt, supra note 123. 
328 Ibid. 
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clear.329 In contrast, the collection of procedures described above makes the Canadian 
system thoroughly and comprehensively ambiguous, with few clarifying exceptions; 
in Canada, complex rules were set in place ahead of partisan rule manipulation.  
 Finally, it should be noted that when authors such as Mazzone and Scheberle 
contend that complex institutions can generate informal norms of trust, they go 
against the grain of prevalent reasoning about democratic regulation, especially in the 
American tradition. Decentralizing power into many hands is an institutional-design 
strategy long associated with constraint assumptions that are common in 
commentary—from early notes on institutional design in The Federalist Papers, to 
the works of many current writers.330 In these works, notions opposite to those of 
ambiguity animate calls to distribute powers widely: an aim is to maintain tensions 
among counterbalanced power holders, each of whom acts to oppose and 
“[restrain]”331 the others in a system of “institutionaliz[ed] conflict.”332 To this end, 
institutions maximize the clarity of the setting in which a decision maker acts, 
enabling watchfulness over, and prompting distrust of, other power holders. But a 
seemingly small distinction—between rules responding to partisanship and rules laid 
down in advance of partisanship—may be one key to making complexity 
comprehensive, and therefore useful as a means of building trust. This can help to 
explain what is, to many, the FEBCs’ surprisingly developed impartiality.  
 Interestingly, the Federalists contemplated but eschewed the notion that law can 
move beyond constraint, and can also shape political cultures: 
 There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by 
removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. ... 
 It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust ... 
clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. 
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. ... 
 The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot 
be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its 
effects.333 
Conclusion  
 Predictability and clarity are deeply prized, almost axiomatic principles of legal 
design, especially in the context of regulating political power.334 Intentionally 
 
329 As noted, some provincial-level readjustment commissions have been substantially partisan and 
dysfunctional after appointing commissioners on political-party lines (Courtney, supra note 12 at 111-
12). 
330 Supra note 259. 
331 The Federalist, supra note 100, No. 48 (Madison) at 311. 
332 Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 252 at 1156. 
333 The Federalist, supra note 100, No. 10 (Madison) at 123, 125.  
334 See Karlan, “Fire”, supra note 36 at 733-35, 741. 
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increasing ambiguity as a tool of administrative regulation runs counter to the 
classical narrative of administrative delegation as a response to the exploding reach 
and complexity of the business of the state. For example, Michael Taggart writes of 
Great Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that 
extensive delegated powers sprung, not from some sinister plot hatched by 
bureaucrats, but from ‘pressing necessity’. The state was doing more. ... The 
night-watchman state was being replaced quite quickly by the welfare state. If 
the state was to look after its subjects from the cradle to the grave — which was 
the wish of the voters ... — then delegation was as inevitable as was the growth 
of the bureaucracy to implement Parliament’s wishes. Parliament had neither 
the time nor the capacity to attend to all the necessary details and tasks.335 
 
Administrative apparatuses, which distance government from public accountability, 
were (and are) necessary evils. Administrative decision making to some extent 
preserves rationality and accountability in the face of the enormous scope, 
pervasiveness, and impact of the various commitments of the state. But in a twist on 
the traditional narrative, we might also design administrative regulation to increase, 
rather than accommodate, complexity. We have seen works showing how ambiguous 
rules can be deployed creatively—through administrative forms especially—to 
regulate informal norms generally and political impartiality in particular.  
 A handful of readjustment authors are urging approaches to democratic regulation 
favouring neither accreting new strata of constraining rules nor passively relying on 
existing informal norms of impartiality. In the context of the American experience 
and its perennial problems, these writers advocate a third option of actively regulating 
informal norms of impartiality. And in a simultaneous but largely separate trend, 
authors in various disciplines have explored the uses of ambiguity as a tool of 
regulation. The ambiguity methods outlined in this article can help address problems 
of democratic regulation. A chief purpose of this article has been to show how the use 
of ambiguity has worked for Canadian readjustment. A broader goal has been to 
outline a theoretical framework for continuing the study of the use of ambiguity and 
its conditions, as applications continue to surface in the literature on democratic 
regulation. 
    
 
335 Michael Taggart, “From Parliamentary Powers to Privatization: The Chequered History of 
Delegated Legislation in the Twentieth Century” (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 575 at 584-85. 
